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PREFACE
My interest in milk price regulation grew out of my
work as Research Director for the Montana Republican Party
in 1978.

Part of this job involved the preparation of issue

papers for legislative candidates*

Since all milk control

seemed to be a timely political topic, I developed a series
of papers outlining the pros and cons of economic regula
tion of the dairy industry*

Of all my work, this series

generated the greatest interest among candidates and party
officials*

Apparently I had judged the salience of this

issue rather well*
I faced the subject of milk control once again in
1979 when, as a lobbyist for the Associated Students of the
University of Montana, I was asked to testify on behalf of
two milk price deregulation bills that had been introduced
in the Montana legislature*

This exposure to the politics

of the milk industry convinced me even more of its impor
tance and the necessity of undertaking a detailed study of
the subject*
This paper will be historical as well as evaluative
in form.

I Intend to explore the philosophical and legal

basis of milk price regulation.

The reader will be treated

VI
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to an extensive analysis of the Montana Milk Control Board s
activities of the last forty years.

One crucial aspect of

this analysis is an understanding of how the hoard has
related to its clientele, the government, and the consumer.
In addition, I will review the various attempts made in past
years to substantially restructure the dairy industry
through deregulation.

New alternatives to existing law will

he explored, with an eye on the potential reformers.
Some of the analysis contained in this paper is
inconclusive.

The complexities of milk control do not lend

themselves to simple answers, as I shall demonstrate.

The

consequences of deregulation or alternative regulatory
schemes, for example, are not always predictable.

However,

I have made a sincere effort to examine all the possible
assumptions and options.

In this way, future analysts will

have a basis upon which to act responsibly.
I have relied heavily on the work of Charles Wolf,
Jr., head of the Rand Corporation’s Economics Department and
director of the Rand Graduate Institute, in developing a
method of critique.

Dr. Wolf has postulated what he terms a

"theory of non-market failure."

Simply stated, Wolf

believes that one cannot assume government to provide the
perfect solutions for the asymmetry of the market system.
He has proposed a typology of observable non-market failures,
and presented it in such a form as to allow a policy analyst

Vll
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to easily explore the consequences of public regulation»^
I will explain this theory in more detail in the body of the
paper.
Some aspects of milk control will not be dealt with
in this paper»

They are:

(1) dairy sanitation laws ; (2)

the national "milk scandals" of the Nixon presidency; and
(3) the recent literature attacking the necessity of milk as
an item of human consumption.

A good study of each of these

subjects is by rights the subject of other professional
papers »

Their relationship to my topic is not so crucial as

to make their examination mandatory.
I believe it is appropriate to lay my "ideological"
cards on the table now.

I do not conceive of any serious

policy analysis as value free; to believe otherwise is, to
put it mildly, an impossibility.

A scholar always brings

certain presuppositions into his work, and for this he
should not apologize.

This does not mean that one should

derQT all standards of balanced and objective observation»
It is imperative to state all sides of a debate as fairly as
possible, but this should not imply that one is necessarily
unconcerned with the outcome of that debate » My standard is
that used by the late C. Wright Mills in his sociological
studies:

"I have tried to be objective.

I do not claim to

be detached."

Vlll
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I subscribe to a school of thought which subjects
the relationship between government regulation and the
public welfare to great scrutiny.

This school is common

among acadamicians of the political left as well as the
right.

Public control of the industry's activities is often

advocated by the industry and not the public.

This raises a

question of whether or not the ultimate benefits of regula
tion are designed with the public interest in mind.

The

consumer may often bear the brunt of unreasonable and costly
administration.

Another aspect of this question is whether

or not a symbiotic relationship exists between the regulator
and the enterprise, and what effect this relationship has on
the public.

These questions will be uppermost in my mind

throughout the course of this paper.
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the
assistance of various groups and individuals whom I have
"milked" for information these past few months. Mr. Alfred
Dougherty of Helena, who has observed the operation of the
Montana dairy industry for over thirty years» cannot be
thanked enough for his historical accounts.

Mr. K. M . Kelly,

Administrator of the Milk Control Division, Department of
Business Regulation, has been kind in answering my numerous
requests.

Mr. Daniel Herbert, Chief Statistician for the

Montana Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, has been
equally helpful.

I cannot leave mention of Mr. Jerome Cate,

IX
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Chief of the Antitrust Bureau, Department of Justice, for
his kind assistance.

The staff of the Montana Historical

Society has graciously placed at my disposal several useful
documents•
Various friends and acquaintances in the Montana
legislature have provided useful insights.

I especially

recognize the comments of State Senator Bob Brown and
State Representatives Ken Nortvedt, Jerry Metcalf, Bobbie
Spilker and Mike Cooney.

I also appreciate the comments of

one individual who does not wish to be identified in this
paper.

I met this young gentleman in Helena during the

legislative session.

He has had connections with the dairy

industry over the past few years, and his views were partic
ularly helpful.
Finally, I extend my appreciation to my friends who
have in many ways assisted with the development of this
paper.

All errors and omissions are entirely my respon

sibility.
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NOTES
PREFACE
^Charles Wolf, Jr., "A Theory of Non-Market
Failures," The Puhlic Interest, no. 55 (Spring 1979);
114-133^C. Wright Mills, The Marxists. (New York;
and Co., 1962; Dell Books, 1962).
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Doubleday

CHAPTER I
PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE MONTANA MILK CONTROL LAW
Milk»

A Thoroughly Regulated Commodity
The production and distribution of milk has occupied

the attention of economists and health experts for several
years.

Milk has been described as the most nutritionally

balanced food item and therefore, a necessary article of
human consumption.

Since the early days of this century

milk has been treated by government as a commodity greatly
affected with the public interest-^
Montana's first experience with dairy regulation
came in 1911 when the legislature authorized the licensing
and sanitary inspection of milk production.

These sanitary

laws have been modified and expanded through the yearsToday, health regulations are a shared responsibility of the
State Department of Livestock, Livestock Sanitary Board,
Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, and local boards
of health.

2

Economic regulation would not arrive until 1935'

Before examining the development of these rules, it is
important to understand the nature of the milk industry.
The Structure of the Dairy Industry
Montana s dairy industry, like that of the entire
nation, has been substantially transformed during the past
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fifty years.

In the 1930's it was made up of several

producer-distributors and producers-

The former raised

their own cows, milked them, processed the raw milk into
fluid or manufactured products, and distributed these to
local consumers.

The latter sold his raw milk to nearby

independent distributors who processed the milk for resaleThese distributors were rare during the early twentieth
century as were the major retail supermarkets.

Producer-

distributors were the dominant type of operation-^
Following the 1930s came a period of increased
specialization in the production and marketing of milkDistributors came into their own and replaced most of the
small producer-distributors-

By the 1960s, small indepen

dent distributors known as jobbers appeared on the Montana
scene.

Jobbers purchased processed milk from large distrib

utors and marketed it primarily in the small towns and rural
areas; some jobbers can be found in big city markets. Many
of the larger distributors have deemphasized direct home
deliveries, leaving this task to locally owned grocery
stores and interstate supermarket chains.

This trend toward

specialization has been common in many businesses in the
United States.^
It is important to the subject of this paper to
understand the pricing terminology used in the marketing of
dairy products.

Producer prices are those prices paid by
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3
distributors or processors to producers for raw milk.
Wholesale prices refer to the prices paid by retailers for
processed milk sold in bulk or packaged form.

Retail prices

are the prices paid by consumers at the store or on home
delivery.

Wholesale and retail prices are often considered

together and are then termed resale prices.
The Plight of the Montana Dairyman During the Depression
Montana dairy operators enjoyed prosperity until
1929.

With the coming of the great depression, consumer

purchasing power collapsed.

Producer-distributors and

distributors were thrust into an extremely competitive
situation.

They engaged in price cutting and giveaway

programs to attract customers.

Unmarketed surpluses of

fluid milk were dumped in order to reduce the supply and
force prices upward.

Distributors passed their losses back

to their producer-suppliers, thus putting several dairy
farmers out of business.

Some dairy operators attempted to

reduce their costs by cutting down on production expenses,
including the costs of complying with state sanitary codes.^
By the mid-1930s, public authorities were convinced that an
abundant supply of healthful milk would soon become a
rarity.

K. M. Kelly, Administrator of the Milk Control

Division, Department of Business Regulation, cites a typical
example of the chaotic conditions:
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In the late 1920s and early 1930s, we had about fiftyfive dairies in Helena delivering milk to 12,000-15,000
people. Each dairy was cutting prices and giving away
milk and cream to steal customers, with most of the
losses passed back to the producers. Producers were
being forced out of business and the milk supply was
in jeopardy.6
Aggravating this situation was the fact that milk was
and still is an extremely perishable commodity.

It cannot

be stored in any form for any great length of time. Also,
dairy cows are on a fixed production cycle that cannot be
regulated by price considerations*

A cow will produce twice

daily regardless of the shifts in producer and resale pricesDistributors are aware of this cycle and can place the
producer in a precarious situation when it comes to bargain
ing for a price on raw milk.

The producer has had little

or no voice in this type of marketplace, especially when
times were as rough as those of the depression.
Attempts at Self-Régulâtion
In 1934, Montana dairymen availed themselves of the
remedies offered by the National Industrial Recover Act
(NIRA).

With support from the Dairy Division, Montana

Department of Agriculture, the state was divided roughly
along the Continental Divide into two marketing areas-

All

segments of the industry would voluntarily set and enforce
a series of price codes within these zones-

Regulations

would be the responsibility of private enterprise with only
Q

modest government supervision.
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Self-regulation soon proved to be inadequate.

By

May of 1934, many voluntary agreements had broken down.
Merchants inKalispell, for example, found their sales of
packaged milk falling under the high retail prices set by
the code.

They were soon selling milk at pre-1934 prices.

When the NIRA was declared unconstitutional by the U.S.
Supreme Court in late 1934, milk dealers decided to seek
protection from state government.

A well-organized, ad hoc

lobby of producers and distributors attained this goal
during the 1935 legislative session.

Senate Bill I63,

sponsored by State Senators Lars Angvick (R-Sheridan) and
F. S. Karlberg, contained the elements of Montana's first
milk control law.

The condition of the milk industry was

so chaotic as to convince nearly every legislator, regard
less of party, of the need for regulation.^
Development of the Montana Milk Control Law;

19 35-1979

SB 163 was passed as a temporary relief measure.

A

clause at the end of the bill stipulated that the legislature
could repeal milk control when it determined that the exist
ing public emergency was at an end.
clause were never exercised.

The powers of that

In 1939» the legislature re

enacted most of the provisions of the 1935 act.

These

revisions are the basis of today's milk control law.^^
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Existing legislation lists a series of bold policy
declarations-

The legislature has determined in syllogistic

fashion that (1 ) milk is necessary for human consumption;
therefore, an adequate supply must be maintained; (2) the
necessity of milk makes it a commodity affected by the
public interest and potentially subject to government regula
tion; (3) unfair and uneconomic practices in the dairy
industry pose a constant threat to the quality and avail
ability of the milk supply; so (4) state supervision of
production and marketing is necessary and proper to maintain
the public interest.

The "law of supply and demand" is

deemed inadequate to meet that same task.
Regulation of the dairy industry has always been
carried out by a State Board of Milk Control.

The 1935 law

provided for three commissioners— the Chairman of the
Livestock Sanitary Board, the Chief of the Dairy Division,
Montana Department of Agriculture, and a representative of
the general public.

The 1939 revisions provided for a five

member board consisting of the Chairman of the Livestock
Sanitary Board and one representative from each of the
following groups:

producers, producer-distributors,

distributors, and consumers.

A 1957 amendment eliminated

producer-distributor membership and increased the number of
members from the remaining three groups to two representa
tives apiece.

A 1959 amendment totally revamped membership
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7
patterns and provided for a five-member, all-consumer board.
This structure remains intact today.

Thus, supervision of

the dairy industry was the province of its members for almost
12
twenty years.
The chief function of the board has always been the
provision of economic order through the fixing of minimum
producer, wholesale, and retail prices.

A use-classification

system has been used since 1959 to rank and price all milk
in the state.
purposes.

Class I or fluid milk is designed for drinking

Class II comprises milk used in the manufacture

of ice cream, sherbert, egg nog, sour cream, and related
items.

Class III includes products like butter and cheese

as well as items not designated for human consumption; e.g.,
milk for livestock feed.

Minimum producer prices are set

for all classes of milk; resale price protection is extended
to Class I products.
Procedures for developing minimum tariffs have
changed substantially during the past forty years. Until
1971, lengthy public hearings were held on the cost of
producing, processing, and distributing fluid milk and milkbased products. Prices would be established so as to insure
the operation costs of producers and distributors and
possibly provide them with a modest profit.

This method was

abandoned in 1971 and replaced by the use of flexible
formulas.

These formulas are to be devised so as to bring
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about automatic adjustments in all minimum prices as are
justified by changes in production, processing, and distri
bution costs. A public hearing is held to approve a sug
gested formula, but all price changes occur without hearings
lit
unless the board is petitioned to revise the formula.
When establishing legal minimums, the Milk Control
Board must follow fairly specific legislative criteria.
Early legislation mandated minimum producer prices be set at
least equal to one-half of the minimum retail price. Also,
fixed prices had to take into account the purchasing power
of the public.

It is difficult to assess from available

records just how serious the old milk boards implemented
that provision.

Today’s law requires flexible formulas to

be based upon such factors as milk prices in adjacent and
neighboring states, consumer purchasing power, and indices
of production and distribution costs-

The old "fifty

percent" section regarding producer prices was repealed by
the 1959 legislature.^^
Administrative procedures for implementing the milk
control law have been constantly revised and updated since
1935'

Originally, the board exercised its power only after

a petition in support of regulation was submitted by a local
association of producers and distributors.

The board would

hold a cost of production hearing, devise a marketing area,
and fix minimum prices to be charged in that area.
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9
below minimum prices would be prohibited.

The board was

required to promote and foster these local associations
under specific rules.

The associations would become instru

mentalities of the board in order to carry out the intent of
the law.

In 1959. the board was given authority to hold

public hearings and establish prices on its own initiative.
The 1975 legislature eliminated the requirement of promoting
local dairy associations ; this provision had become an
anachronism after the organization of the State Department
of Business Regulation.

Thus, the law has progressed from

a quasi-trade regulation measure to a more sophisticated
scheme of independent government supervision.^^
In order to insure the propriety of price-fixing
rules and orders, the board has possessed the power to
subpoena books and records of all milk dealers.

A uniform

system of accounting for milk use by distributors has been
required since 1959 «

Also, rules of fair trade have been

provided for in law and board regulations.

These rules

prohibit such practices as rebates, kickbacks, extension of
credit to retailers by distributors, and sales of milk below
minimum prices.

These activities circumvent the purpose of

price-fixing and therefore, cannot be allowed.
Enforcement procedures have also been created.
distributors must be bonded in order to do business.

Milk
All

milk dealers except retailers must have a license in order
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10
to do "business.

All milk dealers except retailers must

have a license in order to traffic in milk. Licenses can be
suspended or revoked for failure to comply with the law.

In

addition, the board may seek specific civil and criminal
prosecution of violators ; it may also seek remedies in
equity, such as a court injunction to restrain a dealer from
breaking the law.

Sufficient procedural safeguards; i.e.,

due notice of and requirement of public hearing, have been
provided by the legislature to insure fairness to all
1A
parties in the exercise of price regulation.
Board activities are financed entirely through
nominal license fees and assessments per hundredweight of
milk sold by producers and distributors.

The legislature

previously fixed the amount of assessments; since 1975; the
Department of Business Regulation has taken over this
responsibility through the administrative hearings process.
Up to 1959. price controls were exercised only in
marketing areas designated by the board.

These areas

generally comprised only the territory immediately adjacent
to cities and towns*

Amendments have since extended price

control to all areas of the state.

The same producer and

resale prices prevail in every area of the state, although
many marketing areas are retained for administrative
20
purposes.
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11
The Board and Administrative Organization
The Milk Control Board is now attached to the
Department of Business Regulation for administrative pur
poses-

The Milk Control Division of the department serves

as staff support for the board.

It is headed by an adminis

trator and employs approximately ten other individuals.
(All employment figures are for Montana fiscal year 1979 -)
Employees are primarily involved in field audits of licensed
milk dealers-

The budget for the division in fiscal 1979

was $249,928 ; all of this was derived from license fees and
21

dealer assessments.

The Montana Administrative Procedures Act (MAPA) is
the guide for executive agencies and board when promulgating
rules or orders designed to carry out the intent of legis
lation.

Under MAPA, the Milk Control Board and the Depart

ment of Business Regulation have adopted a series of rules
affecting the milk industry.

Significant ones include (1)

elaboration of reporting requirements for producers and
distributors ; (2) provision for restitution of underpayments
by distributors to producers; (3) procedures for termination
of supply contracts between producers and distributors ; (4 )
unfair trade practices; (5 ) fee assessments; and (6) the
indices and factors utilized in developing price formulasSpecific price orders are also adopted under MAPA rulesAll rules and orders are published in the Administrative
Rules of Montana.
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The M o d e m Dairy Industry
The dairy industry has undergone significant changes
since the 1930's ; indeed, these changes greatly influenced
the development of the milk control law.

Under a regulated

economy, technological innovations have been striking.

Milk

now has an increased shelf life over that of thirty years
ago.

M o d e m refrigeration techniques can keep milk fresh in

the dairy case for up to two weeks as opposed to the two day
interval of years past.

The productivity of the milk

business has also advanced.

Scientific breeding techniques

have increased per-cow production levels although the cycle
itself remains unchanged.

Sophisticated handling virtually

eliminates any contact of raw milk with the atmosphere.
Refrigerated milk, whether raw or processed, can be shipped
over great distances without much fear of spoilage ; this was
not possible during the 1930’s.
Major technological changes have been costly.
Capital investments by producers have been so significant as
to make them even more subject to instability should prices
prove unfavorable.

Producers also face the consequences of

m o d e m inflation; i.e., increased food charges and heating
bills.

Departure from the dairy industry has continued on a

steady basis since the depression.

The number of processing-

distribution operations fell 75 percent between I961 and
1976, from ninety-three to twenty-three plants-

The
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national average decline during this same period was
70 percent.

The number of producers has declined also.

In 1959» there were roughly 825 producers in Montana; in
19751 there were 258.

This decrease measured 69 percent.

(Recently, the number of producers has risen to about 330*
indicating some improvement in the health of the producer
2Usegment.)
These declines will become important when the
varied manifestations of price regulation are examined.
Summary
Concern over the quality and quantity of milk has led
to it becoming the most regulated food commodity in the
United States.

The dairy industry has not been subjected to

the same market conditions as has much of American business
enterprise.

Therefore, Montana dairymen and lawmakers have

designed extensive regulations to insure a stabilized and
sanitary system of producing and marketing milk.

Wolf uses

the term "internalities" to describe the standards which
guide and evaluate public regulation.

Internalities become

a substitute for the workings of the price system.
Internalities do not necessarily prove effective in
the course of public administration.

The fact that many

dairymen have departed the industry suggests the possibility
of some improper or ineffective implementation of the milk
control law.

Subsequent chapters will probe this critical

question in detail.
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CHAPTER II
PATHWAY TO CRISIS:

1935-1958

The Formative Years
The first Milk Control Board was organized in mid1935 shortly after the governor’s approval of SB I63.
W. J. Butler, Chairman of the Livestock Sanitary Board,
would head the new body.

The membership was rounded off by

the appointment of B. F. Thrailkill, representing the State
Department of Agriculture, and G. A. Norris, representing
the State Department of Agriculture, and G» A. Norris,
representing the public.

Norris was the former Chief of the

State Dairy Division and was a creamery operator in Billings
at the time of appointment.

Thus, the first board had a

great deal of expertise in dairying.

Norris would also

serve as the board's chief administrator when it was not in
session.^
Norris expressed the sentiments of the new board in
a 1935 press release:
The main purpose and intent of the law is to eliminate
that dangerous element of supply so numerous throughout
the state known as the chiseler, and the price cutter,
who have also been the uncontrolled and dangerous
producer of this important and necessary food commodity,
coming into competition with the reverse type, the
legitimate milk producer, who carries a heavy investment
in the required equipment necessary to the production of
pure, wholesome, safe milk and cream from healthy dairy
cows, and operating under a license and inspection
16
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service of the Montana Livestock Board. . . . It is very
apparent that the milk industry in the organized trade
areas under milk control have taken on a new life • • ■
t his is . . . to the advantage of these actively
engaged in the business of producing and distributing
milk, and . • . the consumer.2
The board proceeded to enforce the law vigorously.
Dairymens' associations were formed, petitions for regulation
circulated, cost of production hearings held, and marketing
areas and price orders established.

Norris began cracking

down on the dreaded "chiselers" and "bootleggers."

In a

celebrated case, the board successfully reprimanded the
Helena Creamery for refusing to pay minimum prices to
producers.

U.S. Senator Burton K. Wheeler maneuvered behind

the scenes to cancel Fort Harrison’s supply contract with
that distributor.

Norris also pursued violations by reluc

tant Ravalli county distributors.

These firms benefited

from sympathetic local judges who would not convict them
for violating minimum price orders.

The Stevensville

justice of the peace, for example, declared the entire milk
control law unconstitutional in late 1935*

Norris' persis

tence finally wore down the Bitterroot operators, and he
secured their adherence to the law by 193^.^
A "Constitutional Convention of the Fluid Milk
Industry" was held under board auspices in Helena during the
month of May, 1936.

The convention, composed of producers

and distributors, ratified a board-approved document which
governed the operations of local dairymens' associations.
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This action was another indication of the binding relationship between the industry and the regulator-

Assistant

Attorney General E- K- Matson reiterated the purpose of the
milk control law when speaking to the assembled delegates :
The public has been misinformed to a certain extent
and do not understand the bill, but there is something
that can be attained, and I believe you people who are
here can do your part in educating the public as to the
purpose of the law . . . the major purpose is financial
protection of the dairy industry -5 (Emphasis is
Matson's-)
The first two years of board operation were often
plagued by financial and enforcement problems.

License fees

and assessments mandated by the law were insufficient to
cover most of the board's legitimate expensespowers of the board also needed some teeth-

Enforcement

During the 1937

legislative session, the board and the milk dealers' associ
ations sought additional revenues and powers-

Their pro

posal, House Bill 1?0, received a comfortable margin of
support in the House but died on the floor of the Senate-

A

number of senators partial to the bill were sick and there
fore, absent during voting.

The industry did take some

comfort in the defeat of another bill, House Bill 21, which
would have repealed the milk control law.

(Interestingly,

one of the strongest opponents of HE 170 was a Ravalli
county legislator with a bright political future—
Lee Metcalf -)^

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
Another attempt to improve the law in 1939 was suc
cessful.

Dairy lobbyists, with strong bipartisan support in

the new legislature, secured the passage of House Bill 201.
The new board was organized in May of that year.
appointed its first executive secretary.

Norris was

With an indication

of strong legislative backing, the new board began carrying
out its duties as diligently as had its immediate prede7
cessor.
On some occasions during the 1930s and 19^0s , it
is apparent from the record of public hearings that consumer
concerns and board/industry interests were conflicting.

A

public hearing held in Havre in November 1939 over proposed
raises in minimum producer and resale prices stirred con
siderable discontent.

Mrs. Charles Hanson, speaking for the

Havre Parent-Teachers Association, expressed fears that the
suggested price increase would not be in the pecuniary
interest of the local citizens.

A certain Mr. Lineberger

attacked the proposals as being designed only for the
benefit of area milkmen.

The board was almost nonplussed

by these presentations; the record indicates that they could
not comprehend why these citizens would not accept the
beneficence of the milk control law.

Regardless of who was

right or wrong in this controversy, it is clear that one
perception of economic regulation was not always held in
common.

(An interesting sidenote:

Mr. Lineberger's
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testimony was described in an initial set of the minutes as
"making a few other wild remarks."

The minutes were later

changed to indicate a more discreet presentation by the
Havre citizen.)

8

A similar occurrence took place in Butte in the
spring of 1942.

One irate housewife took exception to the

board's procedural rules.

Notices of public hearings were

printed by the newspapers in small type in the legal section.
No one read these seemingly innocuous passages, or so the
woman claimed.

She criticized local dairymen for profi

teering in wartime and seeking prices sure to cut the con
sumption of Butte citizens.

The board was visibly annoyed

by her comments.

Again, perceptions had a tendency to
Q
diverge from one, common perspective.^
Despite these incidents, the board proceeded with
the notion that their actions were definitely in the public
interest.

Distributors and producers worked together to

insure the law's success.

Production levels did stabilize,

and violations were regularly prosecuted during the 1940s.
The board's prices were subject to federal oversight by the
Office of Price Administration during World War II.

In

1944, Norris resigned the position of executive secretary
for reasons of health.

Allen Klemme, a former Bozeman area

dairyman and deputy of the Milk Control Board, was chosen
as Norris' successor.
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The 19 57 Legislative Investigation
By the mid-1950s there were indications that the
hoard's operations were coming into serious question from
many quarters.

Wolf suggests that agency functions approach

a critical state when intemalities hear no clear or
reliable connection with the purposes that agency was
designed to serve.

An additional problem is the presence

of "distributional inequities" in agency practice.

These

inequities are indexed on the power of the agency over its
clientele and v i c e - v e r s a . T h e following is an examination
of improper intemalities and identifiable distributional
inequities•
Executive Secretary Klemme had noticed several
misunderstandings about board prerogatives and activities.
For example, the Wolf Point Chamber of Commerce had improp
erly assumed the authority to grant price increases to
local dairymen in late 1944.

Klemme also reported that

many Bozeman area producers in 194? had little or no idea
about the milk board's existence.

There was evidence to

suggest that local distributors were keeping their producers
in the dark in order to exploit a natural economic
12

advantage.

The quality of milk board records was beginning to
deteriorate in the late 1940s.

The number of meetings and

public hearings was becoming infrequent.

By the mid-1950s,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
an aggressive infancy had been superceded by mid-age
senility
The Montana Dairy Producers* Association report to
the board in 1955 indicated some serious reservations about
the quality of regulation, although the association had no
desire to abolish the law.

They accused the board of lax

enforcement and appeasement of violators.
found to be inadequate and infrequent.

Cost studies were

The Montana Dairy

Industries Association, a distributors' group, expressed
some concerns of their own.

Some of the group's members

were concerned that executive sessions of the board were not
closed to all industry officials.

Supplementary evidence

was supposedly introduced during these closed sessions, or
so some distributors claimed.

This evidence was not subject

to critique during regular hearings.

The board heard many

of the same allegations during their 1956 meetings.
Producers and distributors foresaw crisis arising during
the coming legislative session.
Their prediction turned out to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy.

Six bills were dropped into the hopper of the

Senate Agriculture Committee in early 1957'

All of the

measures purported to make major changes in milk board
composition, reporting requirements, and enforcement powers*
A joint House-Senate Agriculture Committee hearing on all
six proposals was held in February, mid-way through the
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legislative session.
John C. Harrison, lobbyist for the Milk Producers'
Association, attacked what he termed the limited reporting
procedures authorized under the 1939 act.

Detailed records

of milk usage and wastage were not required or utilized
extensively.

Inadequate and insufficient records produced

serious consequences for his employers :
We feel that more detailed record keeping and inspec
tion is desirable in that in the existing law the
producer never knows what becomes of his milk and, when
he has a surplus, there is a feeling that the producers
are not being paid for what they are delivering.l6
Harrison also argued for strengthened civil penalties
against violators of the milk control law.
William Armstrong, President of the Milk Producers'
Association, backed up the complaints of his constituents.
The dairy industry had undergone tremendous changes since
the 1930s, he argued.

In the old days, there were many

producer distributors, and it was only fair to include one
of their group on the Milk Control Board.

By 1957» only ten

producer distributors were left in the state, as opposed to
some sixty distributors and some 1000 bona fide producers.
Armstrong's association felt that the board was now imbal
anced in favor of the distributors.

This imbalance was felt

both in terms of numbers and in unfavorable board decisions.
An expanded role for the producer was necessary to restore
T_8
equality under the law.
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A Democrat legislator from Stillwater County alleged
that minimum prices were not being set according to law.

An

easily missed section of the 1939 law declared that the
minimum retail price could be set no more than twice estab
lished producer price.

Yet in his home county, a producer

received eight cents per quart of raw fluid milk sold.
retail price in his area was twenty-three cents-

The

The

producer was getting only about 35 percent of the legal
retail price when he should have been getting 50 percent.
These violations were claimed to be common in other marketing
19

areas in the state.

These criticisms were disputed by lobbyists for the
Montana Dairy Industries Association.

There was undoubtedly

some contrast between their statements before this joint
legislative committee and their reports to the board in 1955
and 1956.

Strengthened reporting requirements were unneces

sary and would be unworkable.

Stan Halvorsen, the manager of

Equity Co-op Supply of Kalispell— a processor and distrib
utor— claimed that the present law was sufficient and needed
no substantive changes.

His testimony was corroborated by

other witnesses including self-proclaimed "producers."

Some

legislators were perplexed by this apparent conflict between
producers on the need for changes in the law.

One gets the

feeling from the testimony that these legislators were
suspicious of the motives of producers who sided with the
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Dairy Industries Association.

20

A confused and apparently

divided Senate Committee killed the bills during a regular
21
meeting two days later.
Many people in the dairy industry were not optimistic
about the future.

Criticisms like those registered during

the hearing would not subside.

Failure to act might fan the

flames of a strong effort to repeal the entire milk control
law.

Producers and even some distributors prevailed upon

the legislative leadership to conduct a special investigation
of the matter.

House Speaker Eugene Mahoney (D-Thompson

Falls) concurred with their request.

On February 19, 1957,

the House approved a motion by Rep. Fred Barrett (D-Chester)
to appoint a special investigative committee with full
subpoena powers.

The speaker appointed two attorneys—

Charles Cerovski (D-Lewiston) and B. W. Thomas (R-Chinook)—
and three farmer-ranchers— Gordon McOmber (D-Fairfield,)
Jake Frank (D-Park City) and Jerry Smeltzer (R-Baker)— to
carry out the task.

22

During the next two weeks, the select committee
interviewed thirty witnesses representing the industry and
government.

They also attended a milk board hearing then

underway in Butte.

In the waning days of the session, the

committee reported their findings.

Accompanying their report

was a list of sixteen recommendations.^^

The report was

almost a journalist’s dream.
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The committee concluded that the milk control law
was fine in intent but in need of major revisions.

They

concurred with several producers that representation on the
board had been diluted and that equity had to be restored.
The committee reserved its strongest criticism for the
board's exercise of its price-fixing powers.

The legislators

discovered that few records were kept of public hearings.
Written findings of fact and conclusions of law were
generally unavailable.

The legislators indicated that there

was often insufficient evidence gathered during public
hearings upon which to base board decisions.

Inconsistent

and contestable rulings were a frequent result of these
discrepancies.
Evidence also pointed to a near breakdown of board
authority.

Some prices were being set by producer-distrib

utor agreements in open defiance of board orders.

Board

meetings were infrequent and review of existing price orders
was rare.

This was proving to be a financial disaster for

some producers who had not received a price increase in ten
years!

The board was also found guilty of failing to enforce

what was known as Attorney General's Opinion Number 1 8 , which
had been issued in 19^9*

This opinion required distributors

who purchased milk in one marketing area and processed it
for resale in another to pay the producers at least the
minimum price prevailing in the area where the milk was
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ultimately sold.

Since inter-market purchases were becoming

frequent, producers and the select committee reasoned that
producers could be easily cheated without enforcement of the
. .

opinion.

25
The committee also took note of dissension between

producers and distributors.

This situation had developed

due to lax reporting requirements and the board's failure to
inspect and validate distributor milk testing programs.

The

legislators agreed with many producers that some distributor
reports were misrepresenting actual milk use.

For example,

it was alleged that distributors would label much of the
producer's milk supply as "surplus milk," i.e., milk in
amounts over and above the amount necessary to supply con
sumer demands.

Surplus milk commanded a far lower price

than regular or "base" milk.

Yet, some of this surplus found

its way into regular use and was sold to retailers or con
sumers at high prices.

The middleman would pocket the profit
2é
from this unethical transaction.
The services of Allen Klemme were found wanting.
Klemme was deemed to be an incompetent hearing examiner and
incapable of developing all the necessary evidence upon which
to base adequate price orders.

He was also found to be

indecisive and inconsistent in handling other business of
the board.

Board members were chastised for not disciplining

or firing Klemme.

County attorneys were also criticized for
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not cooperating in the prosecution of complaints as was
their legal obligation.

Political pressures on these

officials was believed to be the source of their inaction.

27

Finally, legislators took exception to the activities
of Merlin Madsen, a Missoula distributor who had served on
the board since 19^9*

Madsen was accused on controlling the

action of the board, possibly to his own personal advantage.
The complaint was made by producers and some of Madsen's
competitors in the distribution and processing business. A
cursory review of Milk Board minutes from 19^9 to 1956
verifies this accusation.

For example:

on some occasions,

Madsen was unwilling to pursue needed price changes for
producers.

His economic strength and personal persuasiveness
28
was obviously very significant.
The legislators recommended the replacement of the
old board members and executive secretary with new
individuals.

The new board was requested to establish

concrete rules governing hearing procedures, review existing
price orders, and develop adequate cost data and uniform
standards for fixing prices.

The board was also requested

to meet on a monthly basis and issue its findings and con
clusions in written form.

Distributors were urged to file

honest disposition reports with the board and producers.
Testing procedures of distributors should also be inspected
by the board for their degree of validity.

An interim
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committee was suggested as a forum for writing extensive
29
amendments to the 1939 law.
Rep. Cerovski and the other committee members pro
posed a temporary reform package— HB 481— as a sign of good
faith on the part of the legislature.

The bill would alter

the disposition of seats on the board to insure equality of
representation by the various groups.

Two producers, two

distributors, and two consumers would be appointed to the
new board which would continue under the chairmanship of the
head of the Livestock Sanitary Board. A requirement to hold
meetings every sixty days was agreed to, as was a clause
urging the board to maintain policy of nondiscrimination in
the implementation of the milk control law.
30
with little opposition.-'^

HB 481 passed

A Crisis Unresolved
The Milk Control Board was not out of the newspapers
at the end of the 1957 legislature.

When the old board

members refused to resign as the select committee had recom
mended, Governor J. Hugo Aronson summarily fired them.
replacements were installed immediately.

Their

Aronson carefully

chose the new board members so as to restore confidence in
the administration of the law.

The new board soon requested

the resignation of Allen Klemme; he was replaced by
T. p. McNulty, a cooperative extension agent from the Great
Falls area.
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The reconstituted board proceeded to restore integ
rity and equity in the regulatory process*

However, the

next few months would prove to be a trying experience.

The

board voted by a split decision not to enforce the attorney
general's Opinion Number 18.

This action disturbed pro

ducers affected by intermarket purchases.

Also, the years of

lax enforcement and inconsistent administration could not be
removed overnight.

Many legal challenges to board decisions
32
were filed by consumers and producers throughout 1958*
Two major court cases decided in 1958 were not
especially helpful in developing momentum.

In

Heimbichner v. Montana Milk Control Board, the Montana
Supreme Court ruled in favor of James Heimbichner, a dairy
producer who claimed that an October, 1957» price order
violated the express provisions of the Milk Control Act.
The minimum retail price in Heimbichner* s marketing areas
was twenty-four cents per quart.

However, the board had

approved a special minimum retail price of ninety-two cents
for a multiple package of four quarts; the average price of
a quart in this package was twenty-three cents*

Heimbichner

received eleven and one-half cents per quart of raw milk
sold, or one-half of the price of a single quart of milk
sold in the multiple package.

While this seems to agree

with the "fifty percent provision" of the law, Heimbichner
argued— and the court agreed— that the relevant retail price
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was the single quart sale price*

Heimbichner was entitled

to a reimbursement of one-half cent per quart sold under the
invalid price order*

32

The Heimbichner decision was mild in comparison to
the March, 1958» decision of Butte District Judge John
McCleman*

Upon the arguments of a Bozeman milk distributor,

Judge M c C l e m a n ruled the wholesale and retail price-fixing
powers of the board unconstitutional.

The decision was to

have confusing ramification over the course of the next two
3k
years *
By November, 1958, board members were operating under
a legal and administrative quandry*

A special public

hearing that month indicated that dairymen, the state
Chamber of Commerce, labor and womens' groups all favored
retention of the milk control law, but these groups were
undecided as to how to correct the deficiencies*

Shortly

before this hearing, representatives from both producer and
distributor associations began a series of joint meetings in
order to draw up a workable solution.

There was a mildly

optimistic mood among dairymen and concerned citizens as the
1959 legislative session was about to open*
Summary
Despite opposition from some reluctant dairymen and
consumers, the Montana Milk Control Board was determined to
bring what it saw as economic justice and stability to an
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industry plagued by chaotic conditions.

From this

writer* s personal acquaintance with many early producers and
distributors in the Great Falls and Havre areas, it is safe
to conclude that their intentions were extremely honorable.
The board regressed from a period of sincere, posi
tive vitality in the late 1930s and early 19^0s to one of
laxity and inequity by the 1950s.

Many distributors were

exploiting their natural economic advantage over producers.
Loopholes in the 1939 law prevented aggrieved parties from
correcting injustices.

The board had become lax in recti

fying deficiencies— in part due to strong influence on their
direction by certain distributors.

This is not to suggest

that all producers were honest or that all distributors were
scalawags.

Some of the animosity between segments of the

dairy industry was grounded more in unfounded suspicion than
in real exploitation.
Distributional inequities and inadequate internalities were the rule of operation for the board by 1957.

A

new board flush with integrity was not enough to combat the
complex problems that had arisen over the years. Pragmatic
dairymen knew they would have to clean up their own house
or face the extinction of the milk control law.
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CHAPTER III
CONFRONTATION AND DEVELOPMENT:
The 1959 Amendments:

1959-1971

A Crisis Averted

After long and hard "bargaining, representatives of
the Dairy Producers' Association and the Dairy Industries
Association prepared a compromise reform of the milk control
law for the 1959 legislature.

The House Agriculture Commit

tee sponsored it as House Bill 2?.

The bill seemed to

answer most of the producers’ major complaints.

Uniform

and detailed reporting requirements would be instituted by
the board on a reasonable basis.

The provision for bonding

of distributors would give the dairy farmer a legal method
of recovery in the event of violations.

Local advisory

boards would give both segments of the industry a chance to
participate in the determination of equitable prices.

The

board could now act on establishment of marketing areas and
prices without the need for petitions by local dairy
associations
Bringing the entire state under milk control was
another feature of the bill strongly supported by producers.
Bob Ellis, Secretary-treasurer of the Helena Milk Producers’

36
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Association, perceived this as providing the end to unfair
trade practices in the industry.

The competitive pressures

from unregulated areas of the state would cease, and order
2
could return to the industry.
The all-consumer hoard was perhaps the most striking
innovation contained in HB 2?.

Many dairymen had a hard

time swallowing this change, but finally accepted it as a
viable alternative.

Consumers with no interest in the milk

industry might well be the best arbiters between the conflict
ing claims of producers and distributors-

Their presence

would also give at least the impression that the consumer's
3
interest was being observed.
There was some recorded opposition to HB 27.

Gene

Picotte, a Helena attorney and former legislator, attacked
the proposal during hearings as a "dictator bill;" its
strict reporting requirements would unjustly drive small
dairymen out of business.

The extension of pricing authority

was considered inappropriate and destructive of competitionHe predicted that the bill would be declared unconstitutional
and that its consequences would haunt the legislature in
coming years -^

Picotte's first prediction would eventually

be disproven; his second one, however, could be accepted on
its face value.
Mrs- Harold Wright, speaking for the executive com
mittee of the Montana Womens' Federation, opposed the bill
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as giving too much authority to individuals without exper
tise in dairying.

Her position was supported by a few

independent producers and distributors present at the same
hearing.

Legislators were admittedly baffled by her testi

mony, since other members of the federation had offered
their advice during drafting of the bill and found the
proposed amendments acceptable.^
The disagreement within the womens' group did not
stop the legislature from enacting HB 2?.
House 44-20 and the Senate 35-18.

It passed the

The opposition did take

on some interesting characteristics.

Entire legislative

delegations from Sheridan, Wibaux, Gallatin, Broadwater,
Meagher and Powder River Counties voted against the measure.
All but one of the Park County delegates was opposed.
urban legislators voted against the measure.

Few

The favorable

urban vote might be explained by the provision for an all
consumer board.

Conversely, this might explain the strong

negative vote by some rural legislators.^

(Gallatin County

comprises one of the larger milksheds in the state.)
The new board immediately began the task of imple
menting the amendments.

They revised their fair trade rules

and state marketing areas*

Public hearings, cost surveys

and field investigations proceeded vigorously into the 1960s.
Increased revenues from revised license fees subsidized the
board's heavy agenda.

The board again experienced the

vitality of its early years.^
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The Milk Board aind the Courts
The early i960's witnessed some of the board's most
important dealings with the Montana judicial system.

The

impact of some of the more critical cases will be discussed
below.
Judge McCleman' s unfavorable 1958 ruling would rear
itself in two cases*

The Montana Supreme Court rejected a

restraining order based on that decision in Milk Board v .
District Court, decided in i960.

The court, by a 4-1 vote

quashed a restraining order issued by District Judge Philip
Duncan of Dillon.

Duncan's order was issued after two

Beaverhead County consumers asserted the validity of
McCleman's decision.

Duncan also ruled that board decisions

affecting the Beaverhead County area were not founded upon
factual evidence, and that the local advisory board appointed
in accord with the 1959 amendments was unfamiliar with local
economic conditions*

The Supreme Court accepted the board's

argument that the issue of constitutionality had become moot
by virtue of the 1959 amendments and that public hearings
were held in accord with the law.

No direct ruling on
O

constitutionality was made, however.
In Milk Board v. Maier. issued in late I96I , the
Supreme Court again rejected a claim of unconstitutionality
filed by a former Butte dairy operator who was delinquent in
paying his license fees and assessments.

The McCleman
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decision was again rejected as moot without a direct state
ment as to the milk law's constitutionality.

The justices

did uphold the power of civil suit granted to the board under
the law.^
Both the District Court and Maier decisions focused
on constitutionality only as a secondary issue.

The Milk

Control Board was definitely interested in asserting the
constitutionality of its price-fixing powers as the prime
issue in a case.^®

It would soon have that opportunity.

Jack Rehbert, owner of a Billings dairy farm, provided the
direct challenge of the law that its proponents and oppo
nents had sought for years.

Rehberg began selling milk in

the Billings area in 1962 for less than the legal minimum
price.

A board injunction to restrain Rehberg’s activities

was denied by District Court Judge Charles Sande in early
1962. The board immediately appealed the matter to the
State Supreme Court.
Rehberg's defense focused on the very heart of the
law.

His attorneys challenged the price-fixing powers as

they were a denial of the right of contract under the U.S. and
Montana constitutions.

They also claimed that the law con

stituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers,
since the Montana legislature had never established a formal
policy to fix prices.

Neither had the legislature prescribed
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standards and guides when delegating those powers.

The

Rehberg defense relied heavily on two recently decided
southern cases, Harris v. Duncan and Gwynette v. Mevers.
which declared that milk was not affected with a public
interest and therefore, not a proper concern of government.

12

The Supreme Court rejected the defense's arguments
without much fanfare.
the court declared.

The right contract was not absolute,
It was subordinate to "reasonable

restraint and regulation by the state in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative— police p o w e r * T h e

justices were

unwilling to question the economic wisdom of the legislature
when enacting price-fixing laws; this was not within the
purview of the judicial system.

The Montana court adopted

the rule of the U.S. Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York
that the court's interest lay only in whether the law in
question was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious in its
execution.

Chief Justice James T- Harrison, speaking for

the majority, found no evidence of inequitable administra
tion of the milk control law.
The court also determined that the legislature had
provided sufficient standards to guide the board in its
activities*

In no way was the board exercising overbroad

administrative discretion.

The decision was warmly greeted

by the board and the industry as the culmination of years of
unanswered questions*

(The court ruled in favor of the
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board on a 3-2 vote.

Justice Hugh Adair and Stanley Doyle

gave no reasons for their dissents*
Attorneys may dispute the point, hut it can he
argued that the 1959 amendments may have preserved the law's
constitutionality.

The earlier 1935 and 1939 laws smacked

of industry-oriented trade regulation and may have heen
unacceptable in light of the Schecter decision.

It should

he remembered that under the 1939 law, the hoard acted only
upon the petition of the industry ; the 1959 amendments gave
the hoard the primary power to exercise price-fixing.
The milk hoard did not fare well in two other cases.
In another 1961 case. Milk Board v. Community Creamery, the
Supreme Court ruled that a 1957 hoard order still in effect
setting minimum prices for milk furnished to Missoula schools
was illegal.

The 1939 law upon which the order was based

did not mention the authorized fixing of prices on sales to
public schools.

The court also declared that alleged viola

tions of fair trade rules in the Missoula area were unfounded,
since the board had not adopted specific rules implementing
the suggested statutory prohibitions.

The court believed

that the milk statute was not self-executing; it needed an
affirmative response on the part of the hoard.

(The 1959

law did bring schools under the jurisdiction of the hoard.
A price order based on the law would he acceptable to the
courts.
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Another district court decision rendered in i960 in
Gallatin County required a special price hearing and order
for a unique form of marketing— on-the-farm sales.

The

court ruled that the Gallatin farmer in question supervised
17
a dairy operation that had not been considered in statute. '
The trial judge, in making his findings, made one interesting
observation about the potential distributional inequities
inherent in government regulation:
This milk control act, that started as a shield for the
embattled and poverty stricken dairy farmer, may well
end as a sword to destroy his economic freedom.18
The truth of that statement would not just be measured by
the problems of the past, it would be an accurate prophecy
of the future•
Producer and Distributor Under the 19 59 Amendments
The 1959 compromise did not end the frequent animos
ity between segments of the Montana dairy industry.

Two

incidents that occurred during the 1960s bear out this
observation.
The record of a price hearing held in Missoula in
the fall of i960 indicated that dairymen were not of one
opinion on the subject of regulation.

Local producers

asserted the need for strong supervision by the board.

The

economics of the m o d e m milk business was such that a
producer was now more than ever left at the mercy of his
distributor.

Without continuous and aggressive supervision
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by the state, exploitation was the inevitable outcome.
Accusations of unfair treatment of producers, abuse in the
definition of base and surplus milk, and pure extortion were
numerous*

Some distributors were allegedly preventing dairy

farmers from joining the producers’ association by threaten
ing to cancel their contracts.
Distributors denied many of these claims as well as
the cost survey data submitted by area producers supporting
the need for an increased producer price.

The level of

suspicion among the hearing participants was high even if
all the claims and counterclaims lacked validity.

20

Another example of inter-industry antagonism
surfaced in a 19^5 legislative debate over including manu
facturing or Class II milk under minimum price protection of
the law.

This omission in the 1959 amendments was regarded

as controversial from the start.

During Senate Agriculture

committee hearings on a bill to correct this problem, pro
ducers accused processors and distributors of cheating on
their milk usage reports*

They claimed that processors would

purchase milk ostensibly for manufacturing purposes at the
uncontrolled price but bottle it for fluid purposes and
pocket a hefty profit.

Producers also blasted some distrib

utors for "hushing up" their producers with fears of contract
cancellation.
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Milk distributors were outraged at these statements
and pointed to the economic consequences of including Class
II milk under price-fixing provisions*

Higher producer

prices for manufactured products would attract competition
from out of the state*

These same high prices might also

discourage production of Grade A fluid milk*

Despite this

testimony, the legislature gave overwhelming approval to the
bill * Lobbyists for the distributors got the upper hand,
however, when Governor Tim Babcock vetoed the bill as
unworkable and costly to administer*

The producers' lobby

had lost much of its clout when John Harrison left their
employ to take a Supreme Court seat in i960.

However, the

bill was reintroduced in 196? and eventually enacted into
la».22
During the early 1960s, accusations were made that
T* p. McNulty, the board's executive secretary, was to some
extent a "captive" of the distributor's viewpoint, although
he was not believed to be weak and indecisive like his
predecessor.

McNulty left his position in 1964 with praise

from his employers *

His successors generally have been

regarded as stronger administrators and sympathetic with the
producer's plight*
The persistence of distributional inequities— whether
perceived or real— was a common trait of the modern dairy
industry.

These difficulties would influence the development
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of milk price regulation well into the 1970s.
The 1966 Price-Fixing Scandal
A series of federal indictments handed down in late
1966 awakened some Montanans to the economic realities of
the modern dairy industry.

Their repercussions would con

tinue for the next few years.
The indictments concerned attempts by the Montana
Food Distributors' Association (MFDA) an organization of
retail food stores, and several milk processor-distributors
to conspire illegally to fix prices on fluid and manufactured
milk items.

In 19^5 and I966, the MFDA was unsuccessful in

convincing the Milk Control Board to raise minimum retail
prices on certain milk products.

The group then went to

various Montana milk distributors and asked them to quote a
suggested retail price for their products.

Ideally, the new

suggested price would be higher than the existing minimum
retail price. According to the MFDA president, distributors
were sympathetic with the situation of retailers*

They

feared that retailers would suffer financially without some
kind of price increase.

They feared that without an increase,

retail stores might start their own processing plants and go
into direct competition with the distributors.

Safeway

Stores had already begun an integrated operation of this
type.
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The situation was decidedly more complex than the
newspapers initially reported.

Sources within the industry

accused the MFDA of pushing the distributors into quoting
suggested retail prices.

MFDA members purportedly threatened

them into raising their home delivery prices so as not to
compete unfavorably with the retailers.

Distributors who

refused to comply with the arrangement would be denied shelf
space in the retail stores to sell milk products*

It must

be remembered that nothing prevented individual retailers or
distributors from raising their prices above the prescribed
minimums.

If one did and a competitor did not, however, the

former would probably lose customers to the latter*

To

receive the benefits of the price increase, all parties in
the industry had to be involved.
The federal government cried foul to this scheme in
late 1966. A Billings federal court acted on a U.S. Depart
ment of Justice complaint of illegal price-fixing in the
industry.

MFDA and Beatrice Foods were charged with wrong

fully manipulating the fluid milk market.

Eight distrib

utors— Beatrice Foods, Gallatin Co-op Creamery, Equity
Supply Co., Wilcoxson's, Best, Gate City, Medo-Land, and
Phillips— were accused of fixing prices of various non-fluid
milk products.

All of the above-listed firms except Gate

City, Wilcoxson's, and Phillips, and the MFDA, pleaded no
contest to the indictments in I967 *

In other words, they
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did not necessarily agree with the Justice Department that
they had sinned, hut they would agree to sin no more!

The

MFDA, its president, and the three milk distributors were
eventually found guilty and fined.
The propriety of several milk distribution and
retail outlets would be in serious question during coming
years*

The consequences of the I966 incident will be dis

cussed in Chapter VI.
1971 Amendments
Montana dairymen were able to come together again
in 1971 to obtain some common goals.

The major concern of

industry spokesmen was the means by which prices were set.
Cost of production surveys were coming into serious question:
To ascertain what prices will bring a "reasonable"
return on investment to the producers and the dealers
of a particular market, the Milk Control Board held
public and private hearings to collect cost data. To
many this seemed like a logical approach; i.e., accu
mulated cost data can be analyzed and a certain markup
percentage applied to gain the desired selling price
that will result in a reasonable return to the pro
ducer or dealer. . . . However, accurate and reliable
cost data were inconsistent.
The seriously plausible
statement that milk prices can be established on the
basis of calculated costs, is a fallacy.27
The other consequence of this pricing system was
that prices for one year were based on cost data collected
from the previous year.

The present administrator of the

Milk Control Division examines the result;
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The dairy industry was always playing catchup,
By the time the farmer was getting the increase in
o
price under the old method, some of them were broke.
'#

#

«

The flexible formula plan, which brought about auto
matic changes in minimum prices as were mandated in indices
of production, distribution, and retailing costs, was
believed to be the proper alternative.

Established formulas

would signal cost adjustments as the economy changed.

The

producer and distributor would be guaranteed an immediate
2Q
change without the need for long and complex hearings. ^
As indicated in Chapter II, the milk industry also
sought to cover jobbers and prevent unfair extension of
credit to retailers.

A $_$00 civil penalty option was also

added to the law as an alternative to suspension or revoca
tion of a dealer’s license.

Spokesmen for the milk lobby

argued that a civil penalty was necessary because the board
was often afraid to revoke a license for fear of decreasing
the available milk supply in an area.
The amendments were easily approved in the House and
Senate.

A few conservative, rural Republicans and liberal

Butte Democrats comprised the bulk of the opposition.

The

industry did not succeed in passing a companion bill designed
to clarify and expand the definition of unfair trade prac
tices*

Some distributors and small retailers believed the

bill would put them at an unfair advantage with their large
competitors.

The House Agriculture Committee agreed with
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them, and the bill died in committee.

31

A single formula to set all prices was set up by the
board in 1972 with the assistance of a New York consulting
firm.

The formula utilized eighteen indices of economic

performances including prices received by farmers for their
produce, prices of hay for feed, U.S. and Montana employment
rates, and personal income estimates.

If one of the indices

registered an increase, it could have an inflating or
deflating effect on the formula depending on what it
measured.

The same was true if the indices registered a

decrease.

The final price adjustment would be up or down

depending on the net change in all indices.
Federal wage-price controls implemented in 1971 did
not help the formula pricing scheme.

As feed costs sky

rocketed in 1972, the formula indicated a substantial boost
in prices for producers.

(Feed costs were not covered by

federal price controls.)

However, the total increase in

producer prices as justified by the formula was denied by
the federal Cost of Living Council, since the increase would
also affect distributor prices in such a way as to put the
amount of the increase over government guidelines.

The

board again asked for federal approval to okay a price
increase, with the stipulation that only producers would
receive the increase.

A distributor challenged this decision

in district court, alleging that any increase should be
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shared across the board.

The judge agreed with the distrib-

33
utor and quashed the board proposal.
The milk board solved this dilemma in 1973 by
splitting the formula into two parts— one for producers, the
other for the rest of the industry.

Price increases to pro

ducers could now be registered when they alone were justi
fiable.

The eventual removal of federal price controls also

spared the formula approach much anguish.
Summary
The Montana dairy industry came together in 1959 and
1971 to alter the milk control law substantially in their
mutual interests.

The years in between, though, were often

marked with suspicion, accusation, and general ill will among
dairymen.

Yet, equity was continually built into the

relationship by the legislature and the board.

Tight report

ing, full price protection, and sophisticated pricing tech
niques were proposed and implemented to assist the producer.
Although some of these changes were opposed by some distrib
utors, others worked to further the health of the entire
industry■
The Milk Control Board was entering a new era by the
1970s.

Favorable court decisions strengthened its resolve;

unfavorable decisions performed a check on its errors and
oversights.

The board and the industry's credibility would

soon come into question again, as a period of economic and
administrative problems loomed on the horizon.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSUMERISM:

1973-1979

A "Consumer" Board
The mere presence of five consumers on the Montana
Milk Control Board does not "by itself make for public repre
sentation.

If one appoints a majority of conscientious indi

viduals who will adhere to those provisions of the law
requiring a balanced decision on behalf of the industry and
the public, then one has a consumer board in operation.

The

events of the past few years indicate that Montana's board
has shown a marked consumer preference.

This preference has

yet to be transformed into meaningful action, however.^
In early 1976, the board decided to grant producer
price increases without making similar adjustments in whole
sale or retail prices.

The board reasoned that the latter’s

minimum prices were more than sufficient to insure their
profitability.

Individual distributors or retailers were

always free to raise their prices above the minimums if
their costs and consumer demand indicated such an action was
necessary.

This plan was praised by the Montana Consumer

Affairs Council; some distributors were not too pleased.

55
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the board decision.

Ed McHugh, operator of Clover Leaf

Dairy in Helena, indicated that many distributors were afraid
to raise prices for fear that some firms would keep prices at
the minimum and steal customers.

A concerted effort by all

dairies to raise prices in unison could be construed as
price fixing; this would bring on the wrath of the Federal
Trade Commission and the Justice Department, as was the case
in 1966.^
The case was settled in October in favor of the
distributors.

Judge Peter Meloy ruled that the board’s

decision was illegal by virtue of their failure to give
proper notice of the hearing where they made the decision
and omission in not publishing the proposed rule in the
Montana Administrative Register.^

This setback would not

constrain the board in future activities*
A March 1978 proposal to lower the minimum retail
price by six cents per half-gallon met distributor opposi
tion again.

The milk control division administrator insisted

that the reduction would affect only 10 percent of the
statewide distributor sales volume ; the remaining 90 percent
of their volume was wholesale and the proposed reduction in
wholesale charges was but two cents.

The minimum price

could always be exceeded if need be.

For example :

a

distributor with rural deliveries could raise the price for
those runs to make up for the decreases in city sales*
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Distributors were skeptical.

They produced expert testimony

claiming that many of the processors would operate at sub
stantial losses should the board proposal become effective.
They again raised fears of cut-throat competition by the
major supermarket chains.

The board decision was overturned
li
on a legal technicality later that year.
The milk division

administrator commented rather pointedly that "it is inter
esting to note that the board has never been challenged on
an increase in milk rates, only on a decrease in prices."^
A final example of consumer interest on the part of
the board has not yet come to fruition.

In January 1979,

the board unanimously adopted a motion to alter the pricing
formula.

The proposed change would consolidate three of the

formula indices into one index, and raise the interval upon
which increases in prices are based.

The consolidation and

interval adjustments would make the formula less volatile ;
i.e., price increase would be less frequent.

In addition to

those changes, the permissable minimum retail markup would
be reduced.

The net change from all three adjustments would

amount to about a six cent reduction per half-gallon of
milk.^
Distributors have once again announced their inten
tion to fight the proposal, citing arguments used in 197^
and 1978.

The board has taken the position that the public

interest would be better served by competition at the retail
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level.

They fear that non-price competition; i.e., engaging

in unfair trade practices, is presently taking place as an
inefficient substitute for real price competition.

A public

hearing on the board plan has been delayed twice since midApril as industry and board representatives prepare testimony
to support their positions.

Questions of law and economics

will again become entangled, and the probable outcome is
anyone's best guess.

The record of the last three years is

not a signal of optimism.
Consumer Frustration
Although consumer complaints against selective price
increases appear throughout the history of the Milk Control
Board, the reported public criticism of the past few years
has been intense.

Low income groups did stage a short-lived
p
boycott of milk in the early 1970s over a planned increase.
In recent months, consumer advocates have sharply questioned
the need for further regulation of at least retail prices.
Three opinion surveys tend to support that view.
A statewide telephone survey conducted in March 1979»
by Frank Magid Associates of Iowa for the Lee Newspapers
found 5^ percent of the respondents opposed to legal price
controls.
system.

34 percent were in favor of continuing the present
A survey of the six major college campuses by the

Montana Student Lobby in January 1979 revealed similar
totals:

47 percent were in favor of abolishing milk price
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controls and 32 percent were opposed.

The results were

remarkably consistent between campuses ; the exception was
Northern Montana College, where a clear majority were
opposed to decontrol.

A final survey conducted in December

1978 by pollsters for a Great Falls radio station revealed
that 90 percent of the local citizens were in favor of
eliminating the Milk Control Board.

Personal knowledge

about the board was minimal, but respondents were clearly
frustrated over the price of milk in their area.^
A recent chorus of newspaper editorials has also
joined in demanding change.

An exerpt from a Great Falls

Tribune commentary is illustrative :
The milk industry primarily distributors seems to
view the pricing formula as a one-way street that
allows prices to increase forever, but never drop
back more than a penney. That's nice for them, but
the formula has to be able to reverse itself.
Otherwise, it turns into a joke.
The joke is on the people of Montana, forced by
state regulations to pay an unwarranted premium price
for the elixir of cows.10
As might be expected, distributors and other dairy
men do not take kindly to what professor Ed McHugh terms a
despicable "kill job" on the milk i n d u s t r y . T h e i r concerns
and agonies about the press and the public will be reviewed
again in subsequent chapters-
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Summary
Consumer dissatisfaction with the Milk Control Board
has been evident over the past forty years, although recently
the frustration has reached a feverish pitch.

The modern

inflationary spiral spurred on since the Vietnam War has no
doubt helped generate this concern.

Attacks made directly

on the board's intentions are misguided, however, since the
board recently demonstrated a strong consumer bias. This is
not to suggest that board members are opposed to the milk
industry.

Rather, they are motivated toward securing a

meaningful balance of factors in their decisions.

For this

they should be commended.
The perceptions of many consumers are clearly
aligned against the existing regulatory system.

There is on

their part an intuitive realization of the distributional
inequities and improper internalities that plague non-market
operations.

The next chapter will explore still another non-

market failure of the Montana Milk Control Board.
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CHAPTER V
AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF REGULATION
The Presence of Derived Externalities
Wolf suggests that government regulation to offset
market failures may promote "unanticipated side effects,
often in an area remote from that which the public policy
was intended to o p e r a t e . T h e s e effects are called derived
externalities.

Even when these externalities become apparent,
2
they are not always understood or corrected.
This chapter

will survey derived externalities in the operation of the
Milk Control Board.
Distribution Efficiency
A generally accepted measure of the efficiency of
distributing commodities is the distributor’s gross margin
(DGM).

In the case of the milk industry, the DGM is the

difference between what distributors pay producers for milk
and the retail price.

An examination of DGMs in Montana

reveals some interesting statistics.
In 1976, Montana's milk DGM was considerably higher
than those of adjacent states like Washington, Wyoming, and
the Dakotas.

Montana's DGM even exceeded California's
62
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average level ty 4? percent.

Leaving DGMs aside for the

moment and looking at net profit margins (profit as a per
centage of a firm's net equity,) one will find that the
national average was about 8 percent in the dairy industry
by July 31, 1978; Montana’s average was approximately 18
percent.

Some processors do operate at considerably lower
3
margins, but this average is startling.
The Milk Control Division has claimed in the past
that transportation costs in Montana account for much of the
high DGM.

The Montana Legislative Auditor has taken excep

tion to this assertions
Such reasoning is valid for some distribution points
in the state, such as along the Highline and other
rural areas. Since some milk must be transported,
we would expect higher prices in these areas. However,
the majority of milk in Montana is consumed in urban
areas, where processing plants are nearby. Conse
quently, transportation costs should not account for
much of the difference in DGMs . . .
I n the adjacent
states . . . all of which are similar to Montana in
terms of population distribution problems, DGMs are
generally lower.
. . . I t is difficult to accept the
premise that the difference in DGMs between Montana
and other states is accounted for entirely by trans
portation costs
Montana’s high DGM is more likely explained by the
methods of distributing milk.

Home delivery— a far more

costly service than buying milk at the store— is still uti
lized more in Montana than in most states.

This would ac

count for some of the high cost of distribution-

Also,

Montana's price-fixing statute does not allow for various
discount delivery methods such as dock delivery.

The only
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exception is on the "on-the-farm sale" which is limited in
use.

A University of Illinois study suggests that states

like Montana which have strict and uniform resale price con
trols will he slow to adopt cost-saving innovations in dis
tribution.^

Even the Milk Board has recognized the possible

inefficiencies behind high margins :
It appears that since distributors are not allowed to
compete on the basis of price, they must compete on
the basis of cost-increasing service and containers.
The public interest would be better served if the
pricing system provided incentive for cost-reducing
innovation. 6
Ironically, one of the legislature's express policy
declarations is "to make the distribution of milk between
the producer and consumer as direct as can be efficiently
and economically done."
"Minimum" Pricing
Economic theory suggests that prices are usually
determined in a free market by the balance of supply and
demand.

Should an artificial force like government price-

fixing intervene, the normal market outcomes could be
destabilized.

If, for example, a government agency sets a

legal minimum price below the price that would prevail under
normal market conditions, the effect is inconsequential if
there is no stipulation that one can charge higher than the
minimum price.

Consumers will be willing to pay a higher

price for the commodity in question and suppliers will
insure sufficient quantities of that commodity at that price.
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On the other hand, should the government set a man
datory minimum price above the market price, one will see
suppliers providing more of a commodity, hut consumer demand
will not match that supply.
result.

As unnecessary surplus will

There is a net loss to society in financial terms,

since consumers will he paying higher than normal prices for
the commodity, and suppliers will he hearing an increased
cost for maintaining the surplus.
The ahove situation may he occurring in Montana with
respect to minimum retail prices.

The reader will remember

that in many instances, processors were individually unwilling
to raise wholesale prices ahove the minimum for fear of losing
customers.

Thus, minimum wholesale prices are relatively

uniform; i.e., they are in effect maximum prices.

An

inspection of grocery stores and supermarkets in any Montana
community will reveal that retail prices do not vary.
author knows of only one exception; see footnote.)

(This

A minimum

retail price higher than the market price is not about to he
raised any further.

A retailer would he committing economic
8
suicide in such a case.
When fixed prices exceed market prices, economic
theory suggests another problem; violations of the controls

can he expected as suppliers attempt to "heat down" the
effective price in order to increase sales.

Montana's

prescriptions against unfair trade practices should
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theoretically solve this problem.

However, Montana dairymen

have not always been known for their strict adherence to the
law.

Board records and a report of the legislative auditor

reveal several instances of violations.

These include:

(1)

selling milk and providing a milk dispenser; (2) inability
to sell milk to certain retail outlets because the competi
tion owns the refrigeration equipment; (3 ) loss of milk
accounts because of failure to grant requested kickbacks on
the minimum price; and (4) providing "freebies" like ice
9
cream in order to obtain milk accounts.
The Milk Control Division has successfully prosecu
ted many violations in recent years and has fined several
b u s i n e s s e s . N o n - p r i c e competition will still continue,
though, so long as the offender is willing to take the risk
of being caught.

The potential benefits from violation and

the relatively small resources of the division make this
risk minimal.

The board has taken note of this problem

during the past three years; this explains part of their
rationale behind changing the formula to induce competition
at the retail level.
Potential for Competitive Pricing
The milk control law does not apply to federal
installations located in the state.

Hence, a miniscule free

market in milk exists on these facilities.

The Malmstrom

Air Base post exchange price for milk was recently reported
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to be seventy-seven cents a half-gallonî during the same
period, the civilian price was $1.0? a half-gallon.

The

same discrepancies can be found between wholesale prices paid
at federal facilities and in controlled markets.

The

Legislative Auditor has claimed that distributors use far
more efficient delivery methods when supplying the U.S.
government; e.g., dock delivery is used rather than stocking
of shelves.

The incentive for finding efficient distribution

methods lies in the fact that distributors must bid to supply
the federal government.

12

This evidence of potential competition suggests that
retail and perhaps wholesale prices could be lower in Montana
but for the presence of price controls*

The wholesale price

may not be much lower, as will be explained in Chapter VI.
The legislative auditor suggested in 1976 that controls may
have set the retail price six to twelve cents higher than the
13
probable market price.
This paper will assess the merits
of this contention later, as well as the reasons why distrib
utors dispute this argument.
Milk Consumption and the Elasticity of Demand
Elasticity of demand refers to the measure of respon
siveness of consumer demand to changes in a commodity price.
In mathematical terms, the dividing point of elasticity is
minus one (-1).

Negativity is due to the inverse relationship

between price and quantity; i.e., if price goes up, the
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quantity purchased goes down and vice versa.

The closer

elasticity of demand for a commodity approaches zero, demand
is said to be inelastic.

In other words, consumers will

tolerate great increases in price before decreasing consump
tion*

Conversely, as elasticity approaches minus one and

beyond, demand is elastic.

Consumers will adjust consumption

patterns for even the smallest change in price.

This tool

can help one better understand the relationship between price
changes and consumption of milk in Montana.
A cursory review of Montana milk prices and sales
relationships reveals that in some periods, the theoretical
inverse relationship between price and demand does hold up.
A sample period is illustrated in Table 1 on page 69.

Retail

price-fixing can put a dent into consumption patterns, some
thing the law was not designed to promote.
An elasticity study conducted by Montana State
University places short-run elasticity at -.32 and long-run
elasticity at -2 .66 .

Thus, a 10 percent increase in price

is associated with a 3 percent decrease in demand, in the
short-run; in the long-run, the same increase will decrease
consumption 2? percent.

Short-run is defined as the quarter

of the year when a price change occurs.

The long-run

represents changes after three to four years.

It is implicit

in the MSU model that consumers will not shift their consump
tion patterns o v e r n i g h t . T h e long-run is thus the real
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TABLE 1
MONTANA MILK PRICE AND SALES RELATIONSHIPS:
1972-1975

Price
Average Price
per half-gallon
Calendar
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975

in 1967
dollars
$ 0.503
.520
•554
.530

Sales
Increase
or
Decrease

Packages
Sales
of Class I

or
Decrease

in Price

(Pounds)

in Sales

Increase
Increase
Decrease

175,095,005
169,466,4o6
167,394,202
173,492,612

Decrease
Decrease
Increase

Increase

Source: Office of the Legislative Auditor, Report on the
Need for Milk Price Regulation in Montana (Helena: Allied
Printing, December 1976 ) , p. 55*
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indicator of consumer preference.
The elasticity of demand will allow reasonable pre
dictions on consumer overpayments and decreases in milk
producer income in the event that minimum retail prices are
established at higher-than-minimum prices.

The loss in dairy

farmer income is a direct result of reduced consumption of
fluid milk.

Table 2 on page 71 shows the estimated over

payments and losses at various levels of elasticity where
the retail price is "excessive" by twelve cents per gallon.
The overpayments decrease as elasticity approaches minus
one, but this indicates that milk purchases are falling and
dairy farmer losses are increasing.
The question of where consumer overpayments are
absorbed is easily answered:
Under the present price setting procedures, some of
the implied overpayments are channeled into the pro
cessing and distribution segment of the Montana milk
industry . . . others are lost because milk is not
being used at its highest and best economic use— i.e.,
drinking. Deregulation of resale prices would allow
. . . a decrease in consumer payments. This decrease
' . . would be borne entirely by the processors and
distributors • • • the resultant decrease in revenue
to the processor would not necessarily be a reduction
of profit but could substantially be absorbed by in
creased efficiency in milk distribution and increased
consumption.15
These conclusions tend to be upheld by other sources.
The operator of a now-defunct processing plant has insisted
that for every one cent per half-gal Ion increase in the price
of milk, a store in his area could eventually expect a
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATED ANNUAL EFFECT OF A MILK PRICE
EXCESSIVE BY TWELVE CENTS PER GALLON

Level of Demand

Effect at Each Level of Elasticity

Elasticity

Decrease in
Gallons of Milk
Consumed

— •1
-.4

154.000
629.000

- •7

1,128,000

Consumer
Over
payment

Decrease in

$ 2,177,958
1,422,622
631,111

$

Producer
Income
80,000
327.000
587.000

Source: Office of the Legislative Auditor, Report on the
Need for Milk Price Regulation in Montana (Helena; Allied
Printing, December 1976), P* 58* (Data compiled from
statistics from the Milk Control Division.)
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2| percent decrease in volume sold.

l6

Consumption patterns and milk prices have been
involved in a dynamic process through the years.

A short-run

increase in milk purchases may deceive one as to its long17

run consequences. '

Even a sustained increase in sales may

he lower than the level possible under market pricing.

Of

course, the availability of substitutes for milk and changing
perceptions of its necessity in the human diet have their
effects.

If regulation is to be continued, there is a pre

sumption in favor of watching retail prices very carefully
so as not to upset the stability of the entire industry.
This would seem to be part of the board's rationale for
trying to induce some competition into retail markets.
Producer Price Dilemmas
The review of pricing externalities has so far con
cerned resale prices*

Producer price-fixing is subject to

derived externalities also, as the following examination
indicates•
One fear of producers and regulators is that pro
ducer prices may be so high as to attract raw milk from
out-of-state.

Evidence of this problem exists; during a

i960 dairy industry conference, several eastern Montana
producers expressed the belief that recent producer price
increases had made their part of the state an oasis for
1Q

surplus milk from North Dakota.

Transportation was no
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longer seen as a barrier to these local farmers.
Out-of-state shipments can be controlled by requir
ing inspection under the Montana Food and Drug laws and a
dealer's license.

This can prevent "bootleg" shipments and

control the flow of commerce.

These are not substitutes for

diligence on the part of the board and industry in develop
ing a producer price formula sensitive to potential trade
from nearby states.

To this end, the provision in the law

requiring the board to consider prices in neighboring and
adjacent states is a suitable incentive.
Another form of derived externality in producer
pricing is the problem of using cost survey data to establish
minimum tariffs.

It was suggested earlier that the use of

such data opens up regulators to inconsistent decisions and
dangerous time-lags.

Montana has solved this problem with

the use of flexible formulas.

If a formula is generating

uneconomical prices, it can always be adjusted by the board
after petition and public hearing.
Summary
The replacement of the market with government regula
tion has not been a panacea for market failures.

Regulation

in Montana has created difficulties unforeseen by early
advocates of the Milk Control A c t .

Inefficiencies in distri

bution, the possibility of excess retail pricing, illegal
non-price competition, fluctuating rates of consumption.
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and sensitive producer prices do not work to the benefit of
the industry or the consumer.

Deregulation— at least at

the level of retail prices— is preferred by some as the only
acceptable alternative to the status quo.
In later chapters, the author will assess the polit
ical acceptability of deregulation.

For the meantime, it is

important to understand the views of the m o d e m industry and
the regulators on the Milk Control Act.

This will be the

subject of Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER VI
INDUSTRY AND BOARD VIEWS OF THE LAW
A New Economic Order
Edwin Briggs has captured the essence of the dairy
industry's views on regulation in the following observation
of a milk price hearing:
There was not even an echo from the past of the
sentiment that industry should not be regulated or
that efforts should be made either to restore or to
maintain as much as possible of the principle of the
free market. Everyone present apparently had been
conditioned completely to think and to act within
the framework of a very strict system of market and
price controls— though, of course, this does not
mean that all groups agreed as to how far the board
should dictate the nature of or regulate the producer-distributor relationship. But judging from
the views expressed in this hearing, the milk industry
appears to be irretrievably lost to free enterprise
and the free market. The very idea of competition
seemed strange and out of place in this setting.^
What specific fears does the industry have about a
deregulated market?

Do they view the world like their

predecessors of the 1930s?

How valid are their views?

This

chapter will attempt to answer these questions.
Industry Views of Regulation
Montana milk dealers continue to accept the basic
philosophy that prompted enactment of the first control law
in 1935*

For example:

EverettHartman, owner of Skyline
77
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Dairy in Kalispell, "believes that deregulation of resale
prices would be the financial undoing of him and his
competitors.

Although he is a processor-distributor, he,

like many associates, believes that without complete price
control, instability in retail markets would be shifted
back to the distributor and in turn to producers.

That is

why Hartman views retail control "as the stabilizing force
of the law."

Similarly, Hartman and his fellow distribu

tors and producers believe that economic exploitation of
consumers is a fallacy.

The only alternative to milk

control— deregulation— is a loaded proposition.^
The industry's concerns can be grouped into three
categories.

The first fear of dairymen is that deregula

tion of Montana resale prices would encourage the "dumping"
of surplus milk from adjacent states.

They reason that

surplus milk would be hauled into Montana and sold at
lower prices despite higher transportation costs.

Out-of-

state dealers would still find themselves with a decent
profit margin— better than one achieved by marketing
surplus milk in their own states.

Competition from out-of-

state milk would be so intense as to drive some Montana
milkmen out of business.^
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It will be recalled that a similar argument was made
regarding producer prices.

It should also be remembered that

out-of-state milk shipments must be inspected under pure
food and drug laws.
licensed in Montana.

An out-of-state dealer must also be
A Milk Control Division official

insists that processing a license application for an out-ofstate seller could take up to two years.

Thus, potential

competition from adjacent states cannot be immediate in
impact.^
Imports may not occur for two additional reasons
despite the supposed advantages-

Montana producer prices

are or at least should by law be comparable to those of
adjacent states.

Price competition at this level may

therefore, be unlikely.

It is difficult to imagine

"surplus" milk entering the state when there is no price
advantage.

Many Montana distributors also enjoy a natural

transportation-location advantage over out-of-state firms.
This advantage tends to obviate the fear of interstate
competition.

Something must also be said for consumer sup

port of local brand-name products.^
A second fear of the industry is the arrival of
higher prices for rural and home delivery and in small store
sales.

Under deregulation, one would expect to see higher

prices for milk on these more costly delivery runs.
Deregulation would likely raise the retail price in small
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stores since they could not he expected to handle large
volume discounts that would he available to larger super
markets.

These higher prices are considered undesirable for

several reasons*

Many processors cringe at the burden

higher prices would place on low income and senior citizens
as well as the general public*

Some small retail stores

believe that they will be undersold by the supermarkets
since milk is now one of their biggest selling items; price
competition would cut deeply into their profit margins *^
The expectation of higher prices from costly distrib
ution m n s is valid; this is true of nearly every commodity.
However, it is wrong to assume that retail prices would
automatically be higher than the fixed minimum prices now
observed * A range of retail prices would be an obvious
outcome.

The actual prices will depend on market forces,
8
and they could be higher or lower*
As far as detrimental effects on low income and
senior citizens are concerned, analysis of the real world
bears close attention.

Agricultural and welfare officials

have found that most low income and senior citizens patron
ize larger supermarkets rather than the small convenience
stores or home delivery service*

About 85 percent of the

food stamps in Montana are used in large supermarkets, and
14 percent are used in large local grocery stores or conve
nience marts*

Only 1 percent of the stamps are used to pay
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for milk on home delivery.

Since lower deregulated retail

prices would be most common in the large supermarkets and
grocery stores, the majority of destitute Montanans would
reap some benefits.

Horae delivery will not be generally

available to many low income people, because distributors
often regard these people as possible credit risks.^
Ironically, many low income organizations and some
outspoken senior citizens do not see resale price controls
working to their advantage.

Several representatives of

these groups have testified in favor of some form of
decontrol, viewing the present system as a deck stacked in
favor of the stores and the middlemen.

Even a small

decrease in the retail price of one gallon of milk adds up
to big savings over the course of a year's purehases.
Would the small retailer suffer from adverse price
competition from larger chains?
able.

This is not easily predict

If sales and turnover of milk are now quite high as

has been claimed, competition may not have too adverse
effect on profits.

Convenience stores also benefit from a

traffic that finds grocery shopping impossible or inconve
nient.

Should retail prices in Montana ever be deregulated,

this situation would bear some close observation.^^
Perhaps the greatest concern of the many independent
processor-distributors is that large multistate corporations
and chain supermarkets would engage in predatory pricing
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practices to increase their share of the market and eventu
ally drive the independents out of business.

Predatory

practices would probably include so-called "weekend specials
or use of milk as a loss leader to attract customers.

The

larger firms would supposedly even sell milk below cost in
order to perpetuate their subterfuge.

The market would

ultimately consist of a few large firms charging higher
prices.

This reasoning allows Everett Hartman to conclude

that "controls preserve competition" in Montana.

T2

An inspection of milk distributors now operating in
Montana reveals that the number of firms is already quite
limited.

The national milk distributing chain, Beatrice

Foods, owns three processing plants.

Safeway Stores Inc.,

an interstate grocery chain, operates one processing plant
in Butte.

Albertson’s, another large food chain, has pro

posed buying raw milk from a Bozeman firm, shipping it to
Riverton, Wyoming for processing and packaging, and selling
it as Janet Lee brand milk in all Albertson's stores.

A

Helena district judge recently ruled that Albertson's would
not need a license to deal in milk, since the law does not
mention firms which handle all their own operations-

This

decision is currently on appeal to the state Supreme Court.

13

Table 3 on page 83 lists each plant and its percentage share
of the total Class I milk sales in pounds for April 1978 and
April 1979.
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TABLE 3
MARKET SHARES OF MONTANA PROCESSORS,
APRIL 1978 AND APRIL 1979
Share of Total Class I Sales
(in P ounds)
Marketing Area
2, 8, 10
1
2
11
6
9
9
12
5
10
10

Plant

April 1978

April 1979

*
Beatrice Foods
35.5^
40.7^
16.1
Gallatin Co-op
15.8
11.0
10.0
Jersey Creamery
Safeway, Inc.
8.8
9.8
7.8
Vita-Rich
8.7
5-0
Equity Supply
5.5
Skyline Dairy
3-4
3.8
Cloverleaf Dairy
3.8
3-7
Gate City Dairy
3.3
3.1
Consolidated Dairies 3*5
out- of-business
Ravalli County
Creamery
not -in-business
0.7
TOTAL :

100.0^

100.0^

*

Beatrice Foods operates in Great Falls, Billings, and
Missoula. In April 1979» their respective shares of the
market were 15-0^, 11.9^, and 1 3 .89s.
Consolidated Dairies of Ronan had its business picked up by
other western Montana processors•

Source: Data compiled from worksheets, Milk Control
Division, Department of Business Regulation, June 1979 -
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84
Clearly, Beatrice Foods and the Gallatin Co-op
Creamery already control over 50 percent of the fluid milk
market in Montana.

The pattern is like that throughout the

nation; i.e., the processing-distribution industry has
become an oligopoly.

An oligopoly is characterized by many

firms, but not so many that they are unaware of each other’s
market activities.

Usually there is one dominant firm which

serves as a price leader.

Note that Beatrice alone controls

41 percent of the market.

Firms in an oligopolistic

industry tend toward stability with little or no price
competition.

The price leader would usually avoid over

pricing its product, since there exists enough competition
to underprice it and capture part of its market.

The leader

is subject to larger sales losses in a price war.

If all

firms would agree to raise prices in conjunction with the
leader, the higher price could be maintained.

The major

difference between Montana's oligopoly and that of many other
states is that most states do not have resale price controls.
If wholesale price deregulation were phased in under
the given market structure, would predatory pricing or
monopolistic price gouging become a reality?

There is much

evidence to suggest this would not be the case.

First,

oligopolies have a natural tendency in the direction of
price stability as was indicated in the previous paragraph.
Any concerted action to raise prices in the absence of
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normal market factors could be interpreted as a violation of
federal antitrust law.

Remember the results of such a uni

form action in I966.
Second, cutthroat competition by Beatrice or Safeway
can be considered unlikely.

Beatrice is watched very closely

by the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of
Justice.

In I966, Beatrice was found guilty of violating

federal antitrust laws by virtue of their attempted monop
olization of the national dairy industry.

The FTC ordered

divestiture of four major operations including their Missoula
plant.

(Under the terms of a consent decree adopted in 1967,

Beatrice alternately gave up a number of creameries located
in the southwestern U.S.)

The commission noted that

Montana's market was already highly concentrated in the
early 1960s when the number of processors was far greater
than 1979*

Any price cutting or mergers with the intent of

undermining competition would be an open violation of the
law.

There is no reason to believe that the FTC or the

Justice Department would not respond accordingly.

The same

would be true of Safeway, which has also been found guilty of
antitrust violations outside Montana.
The willingness to ignore the law, despite the
consequences, cannot be left undiscussed.

It has been

stated that many Montana distributors and retailers have
violated state unfair trade laws in the past.

It is
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possible that someone could attempt predatory practices with
the hope of grabbing an immediate financial gain before the
state or federal government intervenes*

There are several

ways in which federal trade regulation policies could be
supplemented.

One is the presence of Montana’s Antitrust

Bureau in the state Department of Justice.

Another would be

the requirement of posting all prices with the state.
Distributors would have to file their exact prices with the
Milk Control Board.

Competitors and the regulators could

then easily observe unfair pricing practices.

Posting is

now required in Colorado, it has been successful in catching
major infractions on the state's unfair trade practice
rules.

Still another protective device would be a legal

provision against sales below cost.

This law is utilized in

several states without resale price controls as a means of
protecting competition.^^
Distributors operating under price controls probably
forget that when facing competitive pressures, there will be
an incentive to seek more efficient methods of distribution.
Capitalizing on this incentive could insure successful opera
tion at even lower DGMs.
increased efficiencies*

Consumers would benefit from these
Thus, any competition which might

take place among distributors may not have detrimental conse
quences unless inefficient firms are unable to cope with the
rest of the market.
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In addition to the arguments presented on past pages,
some segments of the dairy industry have argued that deregu
lation of the resale level would wipe out independent
jobbers.

The author recalls the almost tearful display of

one Missoula jobber before a committee considering decontrol
legislation.

He found it unconscionable that anyone would

seriously consider undermining his business-

Under deregu

lation, jobbers in the larger cities could have a rough time.
However, since most jobbers are located in small communities
where milk will continue to be demanded, the accusation that
all jobbers would disappear is pure speculation.^^
The dairy industry as a whole has taken a rather
pessimistic view of the thought of any eventual price reduc
tions.

It notes with some glee that over the past few years,

while the index of all consumer prices has jumped over
100 percent, milk has averaged only an 88-89 percent change.
Former State Sen. Terry Murphy suras up the typical milk
dealers perspectives
I t is an unfounded hope to think decontrol will bring
any long-term reduction in the retail price of milk.
I ’ve been trying to think of any necessary consumer
items that have gotten cheaper lately in this time of
inflation. Automobiles certainly haven't. Petroleum
hasn't. Housing and clothing certainly haven't.
Appliances aren t going down in price. How can anyone
seriously expect food to get cheaper? Of course its
the "impossible dream-"I?
While there is an element of truth in the above
argument, one should remind the dairymen that they are
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avoiding some important facts.

The use of CPI data is

deceiving; is it really appropriate to compare the rather
large increase in the price of one commodity— milk— with an
average of increases in several commodities, including some
which are probably not applicable to Montanans?

Is it right

for consumers regardless of their economic status to
acquiesce in the inflationary cycle over which they have
little control?

Is it wrong to question prices which are

based on inefficiencies?

Why should a society seriously

accept the consequences of distributional inequities?

The

milk industry should engage in more responsible debate and
not beg the question of deregulation.
Views of the Regulators
The present administrator of the Milk Control
Division has expressed personal reservation^ about major
deregulation proposals.

Resale price regulation would in

his estimation lead to the end of Montana’s dairy industry.
Milk would be supplied to the state from nearby supply
points like Spokane and Fargo; most local producers will
have felt the backlash of economic destruction at the resale
level.

Beatrice and Safeway would dominate the distribution

and retail sectors.

Consumers would then pay a dear price

for their milk.
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The administrator is equally concerned over the
board's ability to regulate milk prices under existing
procedures.

He has criticized the Administrative Procedures

Act for shackling the board’s capacity to respond speedily
and appropriately to needed price changes.

This lack of

independence does not work to the advantage of the consumer
or the milk i n d u s t r y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y for this point of
view, the Act is probably here to stay.

While designed to

protect procedural rights of parties in a systematic and
equitable manner, the APA forces us to pay a necessary cost
in time and independence.

It is possible that future

reforms may find some solutions to its application, but that
solution cannot and should not encompass arbitrary and
capricious actions by administrative agencies.
Members of the Milk Control Board have also expressed
opinions on deregulation.

Two present board members, Curtis

Cook and Ed Ward, have come to support resale price decontrol
in conjunction with prohibitions against predatory practices.
Another member, Ken Mortag, has expressed along the lines of
the division administrator.

Mortag believes that decontrol

would work to the consumer’s disadvantage.

Prices are not

unnaturally high now anyway, and producers are doing well,
so why change the system.

The entire board membership has

endorsed a modest, in-house decontrol bill aimed at retail
prices.

This bill would also strengthen unfair trade
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practice rules and give the board standby authority to
regulate retail prices in the event of severe instabilities.
This plan was designed to head off more ambitious decontrol
measures prepared for the 1979 legislature.

The fate of

this bill will be discussed in the next chapter.

20

Industry and Regulator View the Consumer
The author has indicated that the Milk Control Board
has a definite bias in favor of consumers.

One may ask how

the industry views consumer opinion— especially those com
plaints over milk prices that have become more pronounced in
recent years.
Terry Murphy’s comment of a few pages back implies
a certain sympathy with the consumer's plight.

The

industry's concern that deregulation would destroy compe
tition and push prices far beyond current levels also implies
that dealers may be interested in maintaining a system which
works in the consumer interest.

Thus, it would seem safe to

conclude that most producers and distributors are legimately
concerned.

Disagreement about milk control are grounded in

perspectives which desire similar goals but different means
to achieve them.
The above argument is somewhat simplistic.

The

author's personal experiences with some members of the milk
lobby in 1979 have led him to conclude that some distributors
are especially callous when it comes to consumer complaints.
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Some of these individuals and their legislator supporters
were considerably disturbed by the author’s support of two
deregulation bills*

Of course, this observation may prove

incorrect; it is very difficult to correctly ascertain their
motives*
An interesting viewpoint of many dairymen and some
of the board members is that so-called consumer complaints
are infrequent and overstated.

They base their opinion on

the fact that few consumers ever testify at board hearings*

21

(A few also question the wisdom of ill-informed citizens
making judgments about a highly technical and complex
industry *)
These views represent a gross misunderstanding of
regulatory politics.

The average citizen is not always

capable of leaving his or her job or family even for a short
time to appear at a milk price hearing.

Neither do all

individuals have or take the time to understand all the
details of the regulatory process; nor does the industry or
the regulator spend much time advertising the subject of
regulation.

These factors do not make consumer complaints

"infrequent" or "overstated;" rather, intervening variables
usually prevent the consumer, industry and regulator from
meeting face-to-face*

Consumers can be faulted to some

extent for not expanding their horizons beyond their private
lives in order to deal with forces which affect them.
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fault does not deny the validity of their complaints? the
survey data proves that point.
In the final analysis, consumerism is a form of
public good.

Individual consumers may be unwilling to seek

certain goals because there is no expectation of reward or
recognition.

Because the individual faces other costly

activities, he leaves the achievement of public goals to
his neighbor, who in turn leaves it to his neighbor etc.
If individuals can organize into an effective mass lobby,
the costs of achieving public purposes can be minimized.
Effective organization will ultimately be necessary to assure
adequate representation before the Montana Milk Control
Board.
Summary
The Montana dairy industry adamantly opposes
deregulation.

It perceives such a change as radically

destructive of the peace and vitality it has enjoyed during
the past forty years.

Its position is somewhat logical, for

the perceived comforts of regulation appear advantageous
when compared with some of the uncertainties of change.
This position is shared by some of those individuals charged
with the duties of regulation.
Policy analysis suggest that industry perceptions
are for the most part untenable.

Fears of out-of-state

competition and unnaturally high prices are unfounded or
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overly simplistic.

Monopolization is unlikely given legal

and economic constraints-

While price competition at the

wholesale level may be less frequent under deregulation, due
to oligopolistic conditions in the industry, there is no
reason why price-stickiness should be countenanced by
government.

In fact, the "perceived comforts" of regulation

may be detrimental to the industry’s ultimate benefit.
The existence of derived externalities as discussed
here and in the previous chapter have driven forces other
than the board to seek major reforms*

The history of this

movement will be reviewed in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER VII
LEGISLATORS V. THE LAW:

THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION

Reform as Deregulation
In Chapter II it was shown how the milk control law
was "improved" over the course of forty years-

The changes

that were made were but one type of suggested reform.

Since

1937* the Montana legislature has considered several versions
of reform that would repeal the law or at least inject
competitive elements into its administration.
Early Proposals
An attempt was made to kill the infant regulatory
program in 1937 »

H. H- Longenecker, a Republican State

Representative from Hamilton, introduced a bill to dissolve
the Milk Control Board and permanently suspend its activities
The dairy interests in Longenecker’s district had been
vehemently opposed to the 1935 law.

Milk industry spokesmen

from the rest of the state obviously had a different point
of view; after a lengthy public hearing where pro-control
forces were clearly in the majority, the House committee on
dairying killed the bill unanimously.^

96
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Opponents of the board were silent until 1951t when
State Rep. Ed Foley (D-Butte) introduced another repeal mea
sure.

Unfortunately there are no available records of public

hearings on the bill.

All that is documented is that the

bill met a swift death in the House Agriculture Committee.
During the 1957 crisis over the milk board activities, State
Sen. Micheal Ruane (D-Deer Lodge) introduced a repeal mea
sure in the old State Boards Committee.

Apparently Ruane

hoped for a better hearing from this less agriculturallyoriented group.

However, the bill was promptly re-referred

to the Senate Agriculture Committee for its formal presenta
tion.

In his testimony, Ruane accused distributors of

manipulating the milk board for their selfish ends.
decisions were deemed arbitrary and unfair.

Board

Ruane also

criticized the board for what he termed "rude" treatment of
his constituents at a recent Anaconda price hearing.

Except

for a rather gruff implication from one of the committee
members that Ruane knew nothing about dairying, there was no
substantive discussion by the committee.

Accepting the

advice of milk industry lobbyists, the bill was unanimously
killed.^
Another repeal bill was promoted in 19^3 by Ruane's
successor. Sen. Luke McKeon, and two conservative
Republicans, Sen. J .

S. Brenner of Beaverhead and A. R.

McDonnell of Sweet Grass*

This bill died in the Senate
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Agriculture Committee with hardly a comment 3
A New Era of Change
The next set of deregulation proposals appeared in
the early 1970s.

State Sen. Paul BoyIan (D-Gallatin), a

former dairy farmer who had won an earlier court case
against the milk board, called for the abolition of milk
control laws in 1971 »
predecessors.

His bill died in committee as did its

The new formula pricing bill was seen as the

better alternative.

Boylan made an abortive attempt to have

the entire Senate consider the bill on second reading, but
h
his motion was soundly defeated.
In 1973 and 1975» Sen. Neil Lynch (D-Butte) tried a
different approach to deregulation.

He sponsored three bills

which would have given the board authority to establish dif
ferent price formulas for different methods of delivery.
Home delivery rates would thus be set higher than normal
retail store or dock delivery prices.

The milk industry saw

this as opening the floodgate to total deregulation.

The

first proposal, SB 379» died in the Senate Business and
Industry Committee.

Lynch could only muster fourteen

senators to favor his proposal on the floor of the Senate.
A second attempt to consider the bill in 197^ was ruled
invalid by the rules committee; legislative procedures did
not allow for a bill to be reintroduced if it had been killed
in the same session.

(The 1973-197^ legislature constituted
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one session.)

A final stab was taken with SB 286 in 1975*

During hearings, Safeway Stores indicated support for the
bill.

The bill died in committee again at the request of

dairy lobbyists.^
Another deregulation measure was introduced in the
197^ House by Norris Nichols (R-Stevensville) and Larry
Fasbender (D-Fort Shaw.)

Both men had been sponsors of the

flexible formula pricing bill in 1971 »

Their new proposal

would have decontrolled only resale prices; it died on a
massive adverse committee report.

Another House measure in

1975 sought an interim study of the milk control law.
failed 76-19*

It

The resolution was supported by several

Republicans and a few Democrats.

Among the supporters were

Harold Robbins (D-Roundup,) a creamery operator, and Howard
Ellis (R-Missoula,) a small grocery store owner.^
The decontrol bills introduced during the early
1970s came at a time when consumer frustration with milk
prices was not yet strong.

Dairy industry lobbyists had an

easy time convincing house and senate committees that change
was unnecessary and potentially harmful.

The majority of

legislators did not see the matter as controversial and
readily adopted the adverse committee reports of their
colleagues.

With the coming of the 1977 legislature, events

would take a new direction.
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Decontrol Proposals in the 1977 and 1979 Legislatures
The Legislative Auditor's Office had published a
controversial report in late 1976 criticizing the need for
milk price regulation*

Agreeing with the auditor that

major changes were needed in the law, two Democrat legisla
tors took the initiative in sponsoring those changes.

Rep.

Jerry Metcalf (D-Helena) and Sen* Robert Watt (D-Missoula)
drew up separate and unique proposals*

Sen* Watt's bill

abolished wholesale and retail price controls, but gave the
Milk Control Board standby powers to implement them on a
temporary basis in the event of serious economic instability.
His bill would also have prohibited sales below cost and
required retailers to obtain a license before selling milk.
Retail licensure had been recommended by the auditor and the
Milk Control Board as a method of controlling unfair trade
practices in the milk industry.

Should a retailer be found

guilty of initiating or abetting an unfair trade practice,
8
his license to sell milk could be revoked.
Rep. Metcalf's bill differed in many respects.
Although his plan would have required retail licensure and
prohibited the sale of milk as a loss leader, deregulation
was extended only to jobber prices.

The price-fixing powers

of the board would continue, although the board would set
maximum and nor minimum prices.

Under such a system,

distributors and retailers might have had some incentive to
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compete on a price basis*

One dealer could try and raise

his price to the maximum, but if his competitors did not
follow suit, he could face sales losses*^
Watt's and Metcalf's optimism that some reforms
could be accomplished were not matched by the requisite
number of votes*

Milk industry lobbyists packed the commit

tee rooms with dairymen who recited tales of economic woe
should the existing law be changed.

Except for the sponsor

and a few random consumers, the Senate Agriculture and the
House Business and Industry Committees killed the two bills *
The full House adopted its adverse committee report 66-19,
with liberal-progressive Democrats forming the bulk of the
opposition.

The Senate adopted its committee recommendation

Promising a tougher legislative fight in 1979»
Rep. Metcalf planned an even more ambitious change in the
milk control law.

HB 292, introduced in the early days of

the Forty-Sixth Legislature, sought decontrol of all prices
in the milk industry.

It also provided for strict prohibi

tions against certain unfair trade practices including sales
below cost.

Metcalf's hope that many consumers would support

the bill in committee were short-lived.
als arrived to endorse the measure.

Only a few individ-

Organized milk lobby

ists lambasted HB 292 as dangerous and irresponsible.

For

the first time since 1935, however, a legislative committee
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disagreed with the milk industry.

On a narrow majority

vote, the House Business and Industry Committee gave the
bill a do-pass recommendation and sent it to the full House.
Liberal Democrats and a few Republicans provided the major
support for HB 292 in committee.
The House did an about-face on the measure, killing
it 60-33•

Liberal Democrats were joined by a few urban

Republicans in endorsing the bill, but the sentiments of
rural Democrats and Republicans were too overwhelming for
the decontrol cause.

The Business and Industry Committee

then sent another decontrol bill to the floor.

HB 526,

sponsored by Ken Nortvedt (R-Bozeman,) was less ambitious in
scope ; it called only for the elimination of retail pricefixing powers.

It resembled to some extent the proposal

endorsed by the Milk Control Board in late 1978.

Before

sending it to the floor, the committee broadened it to
include wholesale price deregulation.

The committee vote

was again not representative of the full House's feelings.
Another lopsided vote similar to the first spelled doom for
the bill.^^
A senate bill revising the milk control laws—
SB 365— received a hearing in the Senate Agriculture Commit
tee but was killed at the sponsor's request when the House
defeated both of its bills.

As introduced by Sen. Paul

Boylan, SB 3^5 would have abolished the Milk Control Board
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and replaced it with a milk marketing administrator.

This

individual was empowered to set minimum retail prices on an
emergency basis.

Producer and wholesale price controls

would not have been lifted.

Some dairymen were disturbed at

the idea of replacing the five-member board with a single
official ; one processor, Ed McHugh, was apparently delighted
with the prospect as he believed it would be easier to
"deal” (l) with an administrator.^^
Analysis of Legislative Attitudes
Despite the apparently strong sentiments for price
deregulation, reform-minded legislators have been unable to
press their case beyond the committee room.

Consumer repres

entation at these hearings has been small; industry lobbies
have been large and skillfully orchestrated.

The legisla

tive arena is little different than that of a milk board
hearing.

Industry is carefully organized to protect its

interest while consumers generally rely on low income citi
zens, university students and chance passers-by.

The public

goods problem discussed previously is rampant.
There are some interesting conclusions to be made
about legislative attitudes on milk price control.

It is

overly simplistic to categorize the division of opinions
along urban/rural lines.

Urban legislators from both parties

have formed the core of support for deregulation, but there
are intervening variables which tend to dilute this core.
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Why, for example, have many Republicans supported
the milk control law?

Political novices have suggested that

this support runs counter to the free enterprise ethic so
often endorsed by that party.

The author has a theory which

may explain this apparent contradiction.

First, opinions

and beliefs about free enterprise are nebulous and multi
faceted.

Many proponents of the general concept are willing

to allow for exceptions in their own businesses, especially
when the market is not producing results in their favor.
Adam Smith recognized this fact as early as 1776.

There is

a good argument in suggesting that milk dealers are not
subject to the same conditions as are other markets.
case was made in Chapter I.

That

Regardless of the motivations,

the argument is often made that one’s own enterprise should
not be subject to the discipline of the market.
Second, many dairymen are quite possibly Republicans.
Republican legislators may be aware of this distinction and
identify with their economic plight through the medium of
party comradery.

Along these same lines, it should be

remembered that the milk lobby is generally the only group
present in legislative hearings.

Their arguments sound very

convincing without a critique from organized decontrol
1 ii

advocates.
The unwillingness of some Republicans to endorse
deregulation may have been due to the fear of federal
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control.

Should all price controls be lifted or break down,

producers have the option of seeking protection of their
prices through a federal government milk marketing order.
(This program will be explained in Chapter VIII.)

Many

Republicans turn livid when they see anything with the word
"federal" stamped on it.

The author is convinced after con

versations with some Republican legislators that they accept
state control of milk prices as the lesser of two evils
Urban Democrats have in recent years more closely
identified with consumer interests.

Their suspicion of

industry domination of the milk control process also accounts
for their support of deregulation.

These legislators do not

have a bone to pick with small dairy producers.

They are

concerned with preserving small businesses in Montana, but
have no desire to give unjust and uneconomic protection to
the middleman.
Summary
The decontrol constituency has had its roots primar
ily in urban legislators who believe milk control to be an
abysmal statement of economic realities. While support for
deregulation crosses party lines, it is not enough to
counteract the well-organized and convincing dairy lobby.
Consumer groups display their pent-up frustrations in letters
to the editor and telephone surveys, and not where it would
have the most impact— in legislative and administrative
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lobbying.

Before deregulation or other reforms will come

about, advocates of change will have to translate their
knowledge into practical political power.
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CHAPTER VIII
ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING REGULATION
Varieties of Change
Previous chapters have listed many arguments advanced
in favor of removing price controls.

Many of the dairymen’s

doubts about decontrol were claimed to be unfounded.

Some

of former arguments have been drawn from the experiences of
several states that have undergone deregulation in past
years.

It is instructive to view these varied experiences

with an eye on possible changes in Montana.

Decontrol of at

least resale price controls has been pursued by a number of
states since the 1950s.
resale prices.

Less than ten states now control

Producer price controls have remained virtu

ally untouched due to the peculiarities of the producer/
distributor relationship.^
Virginia, Georgia, Louisiana and California have
relaxed much of their price-fixing power during the past
twelve years.

The results have been mixed.

repealed retail price controls in 197^*

Virginia

Volume discounts

are now observable in many areas of the state-

Retail

prices are relatively flexible with weekend specials being

109
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the common price-saving technique.

Virginia law also allows

for temporary standby powers to correct massive price insta
bilities.

This power was used twice to restore retail

prices to levels above producer prices in two marketing
areas.

Although five processing plants closed by 1976,

regulators attributed the shutdowns to a number of factors
2
aside from retail price deregulation.
Georgia’s price-fixing laws were declared unconsti
tutional in the late 1960s.

Price wars did not occur in the

state as a consequence, but retail prices did measure an
increase over the past ten years.

Processor-distributors

have continued to depart from the industry at a rate that
prevailed under price controls.
3
relatively stable.

The markets have remained

Louisiana's first decontrol plan applied only to
retail prices, but allowed discounts on various methods of
wholesale delivery.

Retail prices dropped some fourteen

cents per half-gallon; supermarkets offered the most compe
tition.

After administrative problems damaged the wholesale

price scheme, it was repealed by the 1976 legislature.
Wholesale prices are now allowed to float, and sales below
cost— defined as 106 percent of producer prices— are
prohibited.^
California's minimum retail price controls were
temporarily suspended in the San Francisco area by the state
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director of the Food and Agriculture Department in January
1977'

The impetus for change came from consumers and a

cooperative food store in San Francisco; both complained
that high milk prices were discouraging consumption.

The

test suspension reportedly saved consumers between $50 and
$100 million.

Producers did not suffer although the profits

of the major supermarket chains were reduced.

Small pro

cessors were also able to compete effectively according to
government officials.

The last available information to the

author indicated that all retail controls were lifted by the
end of 1977'^
On the matter of the processing industry, various
studies have contended that resale price regulation has been
associated with a greater number of plants and that rela
tively inefficient processors are protected.

These firms

are guaranteed a higher profit margin to compensate for the
lack of innovation.

A Federal Trade Commission report,

however, contends that smaller-size operations can survive
profitably under deregulation due to limited competition or
transportation advantages.

Idaho is one example of this

phenomenon; twenty-four small and medium sized plants are
able to thrive in this small state.^
Deregulation, then can produce a mixed bag of results
In some states retail price competition and lower prices are
manifest.

Instabilities have occurred in some states that
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have prompted temporary government supervision.

Many pro

cessors and distributors have survived the changes ; others
have disappeared due to inefficient operations condoned by
price controls.

Determining factors appear to be population,

location, transportation costs, efficiency of operation, and
the market structure of the processing-distribution industry.
There is no reason to believe that Montana could not
achieve a level of deregulated stability similar to adjacent
states, provided that certain checks and balances are built
into the system-

A proposal encompassing these goals will

be presented in Chapter XI.
Federal Milk Marketing Orders
In advocating the total elimination of Montana’s
present milk control law, Rep. Jerry Metcalf attempted to
console producers with the fact that they could always seek
a federal milk marketing order (FMMO) to protect their
prices.

An FMMO is a regulation issued by the U.S. Secretary

of Agriculture requiring processors to pay no less than
certain minimum prices established according to use of the
milk.

The order is established after a public hearing on

market conditions in a given area.

The secretary's order

becomes effective only after the producers approve it in a
referendum.

Much of the United States is covered by some

fifty-five PMMOs.

The orders differ little in purpose from

existing producer price controls in Montana.^
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An FMMO could be utilized in Montana under a scheme
of total deregulation.

Local dairymen are not too keen on

the idea of federal assistance, however.

Wholesale prices

are not regulated under these orders, and distributors are
opposed to any system without resale price protection.
Producers have also expressed misgivings about the program.
Should decontrol come about, time amassed in holding a public
hearing, determining the basis for an order, and conducting
a referendum could take many months. During this time,
uncontrolled producer markets would be destabilized and the
new marketing order would take effect in a state with few if
any producers and distributors left to participate.

There is

also some question as to whether the order would cover all
milk or only milk designated for drinking.

Decontrolled

non-fluid prices could bring lower incomes to dairy farmers
Should total deregulation become the state of affairs,
producers would likely scramble for an FMMO despite their
concerns— even some dubious control is better than none at
all.

The fight for existing state controls has been and will

continue to be intense as producers seek to maintain what
they think is a better deal.
An Incomes Policy:

Target-Pricing

Some experts in the field of agricultural policy
have long suggested that the real problem of any agricultural
sector is inadequate income.

Low prices generate low

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114
incomes which prevent the farmer from purchasing capital
equipment, consumer goods, and the like.

Since price-

fixing that is not in line with market conditions tends to
create distortions— shortages with lower-than-market prices,
surpluses with higher-than-normal prices— it would be better
to insure a proper income through subsidization.

This can

be accomplished by setting a target price above that which
the market would establish.

Producers would sell at the

market price but would be compensated at a level equal to
the target price less the market price multiplied by the
number of goods the producer has sold.

This plan, now used

as a tool of federal agricultural policy, eliminates price
distortions while giving consumers the opportunity to make
purchases at lower prices.

The producer is assured a target

price that would provide him with a reasonable return on
Q

investments.^
Such a scheme could be a theoretical substitute for
Montana's existing control law.

Producers and perhaps

distributors could be compensated at target price levels
while selling goods at lower market prices.

The target

prices could be established by the existing flexible
formulas.

The state would subsidize the industry to the

extent that target prices exceeded market prices-

Of course,

the event that market prices exceeded the target price,
there would be no subsidy.

Payments could be made on a
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regular basis after submission of actual cost and price data
is submitted to the regulatory industry.

Economists endorse

an incomes policy of this type since it would bring the
social cost of food production down to the level of consumer
preferences, even if it costs the government ; i.e., the
taxpayer, in tax dollars
Serious workability questions can be raised about
such a plan.

To the author's knowledge, no policy of this

kind is carried on at a state level.

The economic resources

required to make this plan feasible may be too enormous for
a state to handle.

There is also a question as to the

perceived advantage of subsidies.

When the target pricing

plan was first advocated by the U.S. Department of Agricul
ture in the 19^0s and early 1950s, many producers and poli
ticians denounced it as "socialistic" and destructive of
individual incentive.

There is no reason to believe that

some segments of the Montana dairy industry and general
public would react any differently as the 1970s comes to a
close.

Income subsidies are also quite visible and there

fore, subject to public scrutiny and political logrolling.
"Price" subsidies like the existing law hidden behind
administrative doors.

For reasons of economic and political

impracticality developing an incomes policy may be a moot
point.

It would be interesting to further study its

feasibility, though.
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Cooperatives and Collective Bargaining
Another substitute for existing producer price
regulation would be the formation of cooperatives among
producers.

The cooperative would collectively bargain for

prices with a local distributor, or enter the processingdistribution business on its own.

Formation of cooperatives

among agricultural producers is permissable under state law
and the federal Capper-Volstead Act of 1922.

Minor adjust

ments in the state law could be made if necessary to accom12
modate special milk marketing co-ops.
Cooperative power restores a proper balance in the
relationship of producers vis-a-vis their distributor.

Some

northwestern and south-central Montana producers consolidated
in this fashion years ago to compete more effectively.
Minimum price regulations should be enforced by law if
necessary to provide floors beneath which strong distribu
tors could not force a weaker producer association.

A co

operative would also be able to take advantage of pooled
human, capital, and financial resources.
Cooperatives are not without their problems.

Abuse

of internal authority is a common problem in cooperative
management.

Indeed, one observer of the Montana milk indus

try has suggested that the few dairy co-ops now operating in
the state are not co-ops in the sense that their founders
envisioned.

They have taken on a monopolistic and
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undemocratic nature not unlike the processor firms they were
designed to counter in the 1920s and 1930s.

1 Zi

The market

power of large mid-western U.S. cooperatives in their
dealings with distributors, retailers and even their own
members speaks of the constant need for vigilence by the
true owners of any cooperative organization.^^
The economic feasibility of producer-owned supply
plants is also questionable.

A study of such a plan was

done several years ago at Montana State University and con
cluded that the projected returns did not justify the
1 6)

required investment by producers.

Should the same results

prove true today, only government subsidy could effect a
profitable investment.

The problem of subsidy was examined

earlier.
The notion of cooperative marketing or collective
bargaining by strong producers also raises the spector of
abuse of that power insofar as the public is concerned.
Memories of an interstate agricultural "holding action" by
the National Farmers' Organization in 196? are all too clear
in the minds of many.

The spectacle of seeing thousands of

gallons of milk dumped in order to cut supplies and raise
prices seems immoral in the minds of most citizens, even in
it does make economic sense.

Abnormal marketing actions and

undue price enhancement are forbidden under Capper-Volstead
and federal antitrust law, but even these restrictions have
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not stopped farmers from engaging in questionable activity.
Even price control looks better to some in comparison with
this activity
Despite their inherent problems, cooperative market
ing and processing could be a viable institution even with
some minimum price fixtures left intact.

As agriculture

faces continuing demands on its land, labor and other
resources, they may be the only feasibly farm organization
for a state like sparsely-populated Montana.
Public Enterprise
During a period of milk market instability in
Wisconsin in the 1930s, the state's legislature considered
putting state or local government into the milk distribution
business.

This program of "municipalization" of private

processor-distributors was designed to cut supposedly out
landish price-gouging by the industry in its dealing with
producers and consumers.

The bill had broad support, but
1ft
not enough to insure its final passage.
If Montana's oligopolistic distribution system would
be unstable and exploitive under deregulation, then perhaps
the proper safeguards would be the infusion of so-called
"public enterprise" by the government.
be of three kinds :

The enterprise could

(1) Direct state ownership and operation

of one or more processing plants purchased from private
owners or newly built with public funds.

Montana has
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already established a precedent of public ownership in the
liquor business.

The state-owned facilities would serve as

a "yardstick" in measuring the practices of privately-owned
distributors.

The public firms could be required to operate

at a profit and submit payments in lieu of taxes paid by a
regular private firm.

This would insure some parity in the

competition between public and private firms; (2) Partial
public ownership and/or supervision of privately-owned dis
tributors .

The state would purchase an interest in an

existing company's activities, or appoint "public directors"
as part of the management of the firm.

The director would

have access to records and activities of the distributor.
This would insure the state an opportunity to measure the
equity and economy of the firm’s business practices; (3)
Regulation of milk distributors as a "public utility" like
Montana Power or Mountain Bell.

The state would insure

specific and reasonable profits to each firm at rates that
19
are fair and just to retailers, producers and consumers.
There is little liklihood of the third alternative
becoming a reality.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Hegemen

Farms Corporation v. Baldwin that while affected with a
public interest, the milk industry cannot be considered a
public utility in the legal sense.

20

The first and second

options would surely be seen as alien and too ambitious by
the industry, government, and the public.

The cry of
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socialism may prove too effective even in a day when more
citizens urge the nationalization of the oil industry.
Wholly-owned public firms may prove inefficient and seek
legislative subsidization as a bail-out for ineptitude.
Partial ownership may be impractical and ill-suited to the
internal ownership-management structure of Montana
distributors.
Wolf's theory of non-market failures easily applies
in the case of public enterprise.

There is also a question

as to whether the problems of an oligopolistic industry
really require drastic government supervision.

The costs of

regulation may outweigh any potential gains, although the
provision for public directors or supervisors might provide
a means of preventing unfair trade practices.
A Consumer Council
When public utilities in Montana seek a rate
increase, the consumer is assured of representation by
trained, supervised economists and attorneys; i.e., the
Montana Consumer Council.

The creation of a "milk consumer

council" that would intervene on behalf of consumers during
public hearings on price order or board regulations could
insure a consistent pattern of misrepresentation that the
board does not now see.

A small staff consisting of accoun

tants, economists and attorneys could be supported by a
small checkoff fee on the retail price of milk, just as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

121
public utilities pay a small consumer tax today.

The coun

cil could be supervised by a bipartisan legislative committee
paralleling the present Legislative Consumer Council.
It can be argued that such a mechanism duplicates
existing functions of the Montana Milk Control Board.
board is presently made up of consumers.

The

They and the staff

of the Milk Control Division presumably establish prices
that are fair to all parties.

However, this same argument

could be made about the Public Service Commission.

Elected

commissioners theoretically represent the legitimate
interests of the public as well as the utilities.

The Con

sumer Council insures that public representation is real and
not assumed.

The prospects for a legislative milk consumer

council should be pursued as a means of solving the public
goods problem if the existing regulatory machinery is to
remain intact.
Summary
Although there are alternatives to the present system,
the practicality of each one can be called into question.
Some form of deregulation, possibly combined with bits and
pieces of other proposals, seems to be the only practical
alternative from an economic standpoint.

Milk price regula

tion operates within a political framework, however.

The

evidence presented in Chapter VII suggests that radical
reform of the existing law has been an impossibility.
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reforms are advancing more rapidly nowadays and may receive
support in constituencies other than the legislature.
Developing a base for political change will be the subject
of Chapter IX.
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CHAPTER IX
SOURCES OF REFORM:

AN EVALUATION

Building a Constituency for Change
Various legislators and the Milk Control Board
have tried and failed to direct new ideas into constructive
action.

Assuming the continued saliency of milk prices as

a political issue, it is wise to consider whether these
groups can translate a knowledge of reform into political
change.

This consideration will be examined in the follow

ing pages, keeping in mind the proposition that the dairy
industry is not likely to compromise the law much further.
The Legislature
While decontrol legislation has failed to pass every
time since 1937» the legislature is still a likely forum
for change.

Optimists point to one existing mechanism as a

means of controlling potential abuses and indiscretions of
public regulatory agencies*

This mechanism, the so-called

"sunset law," is designed to abolish or restructure agencies
that are no longer serving the purposes for which they are
intended.

Legislative policy declares that business and

professional regulation must serve the public health and

125
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welfare and not have an adverse effect on the competitive
market.

Theoretically, all agencies involved in such

regulation are automatically terminated unless a performance
audit indicates that the agency serves a useful purpose.

If

it is reestablished, its life is extended for six years,
whereupon a new performance audit will be conducted.

Sunset

is an action-forcing mechanism which forces legislators to
review their creations periodically.

The burden of proof of

service is shifted from the legislature to the agency.^
All agencies are reviewed on a cyclical basis.
Fourteen agencies were reviewed between 1977 and 1979*
Another twenty-one agencies will be reviewed between 1979
and 1981.

The final cycle will extend from I98I to 1983.

The Milk Control Board will be included in the final cycle.
The legislative auditor’s office is responsible for develop
ing performance audits of each agency during the examination period.

2

Like performance budgeting, management by objectives,
and zero-based budgeting, there is something of political
naivete in the establishment of sunset legislation.

Not all

individuals concur on one definition of the "public health
and welfare" or "efficiency?"

These terms take on a polit

ical meaning as various interest groups jockey to save those
boards and agencies that "truly" serve the public, and
eliminate the "unnecessary" or "detrimental" ones.
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law can provide information on agency activities and perhaps
force the consideration of that information, hut it cannot
require the information to be believed or accepted by all
individuals•
Of the thirteen agencies up for review by the 1979
legislature, only three were abolished; none of these were
of much significance in the regulatory framework of the
state.

The rest were reenacted with only modest revisions*

Legislative action did not follow recommendations in many
cases.

A notable exception was the restructuring of real

estate regulation.

Still, the future may prove the better

of sunset; after all, it has nowhere to go but up.^
The legislative auditor has already questioned the
need for resale price protection of milk.

It remains to be

seen whether the legislature will ultimately carry out those
recommendations.

That will depend on whether several legis

lators are either convinced of the need for change or
replaced by people who are already convinced.

This puts a

great burden on the public— especially urban voters— to
relay any dissatisfaction they might have with milk control.
The Governor
Montana governors have not been known to provide
much effective leadership in legislative matters; there are
a few exceptions to this rule (e.g., Joseph Dixon and
Forrest Anderson.)

The present governor, Thomas Judge,
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sides with the advocates of control.

5

One Republican candi

date for governor in 1980 has supported deregulation mea
sures as a legislator, but he may not press the issue in his
campaign.^

Taxing, government spending, and evironment/

energy problems will be given more importance in the hierar
chy of campaign politics*

It is also unlikely that a gover

nor or governor candidate will alienate rural constituents
on the issue of milk control.

All the major farm organiza

tions have opposed deregulation in previous sessions.^
Other Executive Branch Agencies
The Milk Control Board has been skewered on several
occasions when trying to devise new price orders-

Should the

board's recent proposal survive an August 1979 hearing and
possible court challenge, it will be the first significant
change in many years.

The outcome is not easily predictable.

Another executive agency has indicated an interest in
criticizing the present regulatory structure.

The Antitrust

Enforcement Bureau (ABB) of the Montana Department of
Justice is presently investigating state agency practices
which may adversely affect competition.

The milk board has

been selected as one of their prime areas of investigation.
The Federal Trade Commission has let it be known that it will
strike down regulations that have outlived their purpose and
which perpetuate inequities and inefficiencies.

The FTC has

already acted on legal and dental advertising, and eyeglass
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manufacturing and salesarea of study.

Milk control is another potential

The AEB program gives Montana a chance to

"put its own house in order before the federal government
18
sends in a housekeeper-"
AEB files are confidential, so this author is unaware
of their contents.

All that is known is that the investigaQ

tion has proceeded as planned.^
The Courts
The Montana judiciary is not a proper forum for
revamping economic regulation.

The Supreme Court has made

it clear that the milk control law is constitutional; it
will not question the economic wisdom of the lawmakers.

A

recent Nebraska Supreme Court decision striking down that
state's milk control law is inapplicable to Montana.

The

Gillette Dairy Inc., v. Nebraska Dairy Product Board ruling
uses a substantive due process test to question economic
judgments.

This test is almost never applied in economic

cases— at least that has been the rule since the Nebbia
decision in 193^*^^
District courts and attorneys in Montana will likely
follow the lead of the Supreme Court in assessing the valid
ity of milk price regulation.

Attorneys who defended

Rehberg in 19^2 were conservative Republicans opposed to
government regulation.

The Chief Attorney, Rex Hibbs, voted

against the 1959 amendments when serving as a state senator
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from Yellowstone County.

11

Courts will only provide a check

on questionable administrative decisions of the Milk Control
Board.
Political Parties
Montana's political parties will not force the issue
of milk price deregulation.

The issue would be hotly con

tested and would leave bad feelings more than party unity.
Also, parties are notoriously incapable of enforcing many
platform decisions on their legislators.

In the absence of

sanctions; i.e., control over candidate selection, pre
primary endorsements, etc., political parties are not a sound
constituency for change.
The Dairy Industry
One cannot leave out the possibility that the
industry itself will support a reform proposal— at the very
least, a compromise measure which would take some of the
steam out of a full-blown reform effort.

One eastern

Montana producer remarked to this writer after a legislative
hearing that "something has got to be done with the law to
keep everybody happy, but I just don't know what that is."

12

Another source within the industry has indicated that
even Jimmy "the Greek" Snyder would not lay good money down
on the chances of getting the industry to change— much less
even estimate the odds.

This source characterizes the
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dairymen— mainly the distributors— as too stubborn and
unwilling to change despite the pleadings of their more
astute lobbyists.

Some of them are legitimately concerned

for their financial welfare; the others are described as
selfish souls who have only disdain for the public.
Unless a respectable opposition develops in the
political arena, the dairy lobby will wage a heated battle
for its views.

The comfort of the status quo is not worth

a sacrifice.
The Public
The problems of consumer organization have been
thoroughly explained.

One group is now attempting to solve

that problem by sponsoring an initiative to repeal price
controls.

Not much is known about this effort, although its
1if.
existence has been confirmed by several sources.
Assuming
surveys are registering a correct reading on public view, a
small, inexpensive repeal effort could g a m e r many signatures
in the urban areas and gain ballot status.

The liberaliza

tion of requirements for obtaining signatures on an initia
tive has contributed to the eventual success of many recent
ballot issues.

Thus, a popular initiative may be the easiest

means of reforming the milk control law between now and
1981.^^
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One problem with voter initiatives is that they can
be hastily and sloppily written without regard for legal,
economic, and political consequences*

Two such measures, a

recall procedure for public officials and a state budget
ceiling, found their way to the 1976 ballot.
contained ambiguous and inconsistent wording.

Both proposals
Voters

defeated the budget proposal but passed the recall plan.
The 1977 legislature had to amend the procedures to remove
ambiguities.^^

An improperly worded initiative on milk con

trol would have to be drastically revised by the legislature.
Even a well-written proposal could face retaliation by
dairymen in the 1981 legislature.

Consumer vigilance would

have to extend beyond the November election to make any
successful initiative a lasting proposition.
Summary
Pew of Montana's political institutions offer them
selves as viable constituencies for radical restructuring of
the milk control law.

The people have often responded

directly when their elected officials fail to act according
to their wishes*

The events of the coming year will prove

whether milk price controls will be subject to this direct
action.
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CHAPTER X
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A Historical Overview
The history of milk price regulation in Montana has
a dual face.

Sincerity of purpose in designing the law has

often been matched by abuse and domination in its implemen
tation.

The chaotic conditions which prompted enactment of

the law in the 1930s have been replaced by new market real
ities.

Although processor-distributor control of the board

and the direction of the law has been muted in past years, a
consumer-oriented board has been frustrated in its attempt
to further rectify the economic and political imbalance.
The public's dissatisfaction with milk prices has not been
channeled into constructive change due to the public goods
problem and the definite political advantage held by the
organized dairy lobby.
In short, the operation of the Milk Control Board
falls neatly within the confines of Wolf's theory of nonmarket failure.

Regulation seems to have a logic all its

own Î its path is embellished with increasingly detailed con
trols and the inequities and externalities that arise as a
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consequence of those controls»

One political scientist has

recently suggested that the breakdown of bureaucratic con
trol in states like Montana may lead to federal preemption
of many traditional state responsibilities.^

The Federal

Trade Commission may in fact be the agent which ultimately
corrects deficiencies in the milk control law.

Ironically,

Montana dairymen have insisted that the state rather than
the federal government is in a better position to keep the
economic peace of their industry!
A Modest Proposal
In order that Montana might put its own house in
order, the author has some suggested proposals which could
correct economic inefficiency and diffuse industry political
clout:
1.

Wholesale and retail price controls, including the
setting of jobber prices, should be phased out
gradually. The legislature or the people by
initiative should specify a deadline for termina
tion of controls. The milk board would develop the
administrative details for the phase-out.

2.

The board should retain authority to re impose resale
price controls on a temporary basis in the event of
emergencies. The law should define "emergency" so
as not to not allow broad administrative discretion
or unwarranted influence by the industry. A pre
sumption in favor of competitive markets should be
established by the legislature as a guide to the
board when exercising their power. An emergency
order would be adopted without need of a public
hearing and would be in effect for, say, 120 days.
During the period of the order, a hearing should be
held to determine whether the order should be
extended.
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3*

Mechanisms should he established to protect against
predatory pricing in the dairy industry. Useful
tools could include requiring dealers to post their
costs and prices on a periodic basis, and prohibit
ing sales below cost. Continuous monitoring by
state antitrust authorities of potential abuses in
the industry will be necessary.
There are some problems with prohibiting sales
below costs. Unless a workable definition of
dealers' cost can be agreed upon, enforcement of
this provision would be difficult. Such prohibi
tions could themselves be interpreted under certain
conditions as a form of resale price maintenance and
therefore, potentially damaging to the public
interest. The legislature should devise a workable
standard based on the experiences of other states.
Producer price controls should be continued. While
this might seem discriminatory to distributors, it
can be justified on the basis of the unique relation
ship between producer and distributor. Guiding
principles behind this proposal are protection of
small agricultural units as a social good, and
realization of the political clout of the dairy
lobby.
Legal price protection always involves the
possibility of economic inefficiencies.
In the long
run, it would be more economically advantageous for
producers to develop cooperative processing and/or
marketing programs as an alternative to producer
price controls. These efforts could provide suit
able prices and the ability to exploit economies of
scale. Economic efficiencies derived from coopera
tive ventures could then be transferred to consumers*

5-

All milk retailers should be licensed.
The license
would be purchased for a nominal fee and would be
subject to suspension or revocation upon a finding
that the law or board rules and orders have been
violated by the retailer. The license should not be
issued on a quota basis. The purpose of retail
licensure is to give the board greater authority in
controlling unfair trade practices.^

6.

The independent testing program of the board should
be strengthened. The 1977 legislature gave the
Department of Business Regulation the authority to
inspect milk on an independent basis. The 1979
legislature cut this program back. Despite the
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existence of Proposition 13 fever, the legislature
should be obligated to fund those laws it has
enacted. The testing program can be used to catch
unscrupulous processors and assist honest firms to
update the quality of their testing program.3
With the major exception of wholesale price deregu
lation, and the provision for lesser items, this proposal is
remarkably similar to one endorsed by the Milk Control
Board in late 1978.^

Processor-distributors should not be

entitled to full price protection, given the arguments
advanced earlier.

The provisions of items 3 and 5 of the

above proposal should be sufficient safeguards.

Government

price protection of an oligoply is practically unnecessary
if not down right absurd.^
One point not yet stressed is that processor-distrib
utors have been departing the industry at a standard rate
under price control.

This has been due to a number of

factors; inefficiency of operation; poor management; etc.
There is no reason to believe that these problems will cease
when and if price controls are lifted. Legislators, the
board, and the public should be on guard that the industry
does not use the phenomena of natural departure as a guise
for reimplementing a permanent price-fixing scheme.
This package of reforms may appear to be a less-thanlogical outcome of the critical analysis presented in
previous chapters.

The author has tempered the necessity of

reform with political realities.

It is reasonable to expect
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reformers to implement a proposal without making certain
concessions to dairy interests.

Unless the balance of power

is overwhelmingly in favor of the reformers, trade-offs and
compromise of economic and political values will be neces
sary.

This "modest proposal" is designed with political

realities in mind.
Conclusion
Harold Lasswell once described politics as a process
of who gets what, when, and how.^

Obviously the design,

implementation, and continuation of milk price control fits
into this general category of political intrigue. Alter
natives to existing regulations will come about only at the
expense of a fierce lobbying effort by many interests.
Efforts to dissolve the inequities of regulation have been
successful in many states.

It remains to be seen whether

Montana will accomplish the same goal without contributing
to economic chaos.

Failure to proceed in a reasonable

fashion may lead to "Big Brother" in Washington becoming the
final arbiter.
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CHAPTER XI
^"Unicameral legislature could cure state’s
political ills, says UM prof," Great Falls Tribune.
8 July 1979, P- 15p
Office of the Legislative Auditor, Report, p. 85*
3
Interview with K. M- Kelly, Helena, Montana,
22 June 1979'
^Minutes of the Montana Milk Control Board,
Volume 6, December 9» 1978•
^"Milk ruling lauded," Great Falls Tribune,
27 April 1976, p. 5^Harold Lasswell, Politics :
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938).

Who Gets What, When. How
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